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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

TASTERS' LTD., INC.,
Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 920659-CA

DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT
SECURITY,

Category 7

Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
This
Review

Court

has

pursuant

to

jurisdiction
Article

8,

over

this

Section

3

Petition
of

the

for
Utah

Constitution; Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-4-10(i) and
63-46b-16; and Rule 14 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Were the Board of Review's Findings of Fact based on

substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record?

Was the Board of Reviewfs decision that Tasters1

2*

demonstrators

are

employees

as

opposed

to

independent

contractors reasonable and rational?
3.

Is the Board of Review1s decision within the scope of

authority of the Court of Appeals' remand order?
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS AT ISSUE
The statutes and rules which are determinative in this
matter are set forth verbatim in Appendix A, and include the
following:
Section 35-4-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
as amended (1991).
Section 35-4-10(i), Utah Code
1953, as amended (1991).

Annotated

Section 35-4-22.1(6), Utah Code Annotated
1953 (Supp. 1992).
Section 35-4-22(j)(5) [35-4-22.3(3)], Utah
Code Annotated 1953 (Supp. 1989).
Section 63-46b-16, Utah
Code
1953, as amended (1991).

Annotated

Rule 14, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This proceeding was initiated by Tasters who sought a
ruling from the Utah Department of Employment Security as to
the status of its demonstrators under the Utah Employment
Security Act as a result of the 1989 change in the statutory
2

test to determine whether a worker is an employee or an
independent contractor under Section 35-4-22(j)(5) [presently
35-4-22.3(3)].
August

31,

The Department issued a determination dated
1989

that

Tasters1

demonstrators

were

not

independent contractors but employees of Tasters pursuant to
Section 35-4-22(j)(5) [35-4-22.3(3)] of the Utah Employment
Security

Act.

(See Appendix

Department's determination.

B)

Tasters

appealed

the

In a decision dated April 18,

1990, an Administrative Law Judge affirmed the Department's
decision.

(See Appendix C)

On May 16, 1990, Tasters filed an

appeal from the decision of the Administrative Law Judge to
the Board of Review.
decision

On July 10, 1990, the Board entered a

(first decision) affirming the ALJ's decision that

Tasters' demonstrators are not independent contractors but are
Tasters' employees pursuant to Section 35-4-22(j)(5) [35-422.3(3).

(See Appendix D)

On August 21, 1990, Tasters filed

a Petition for Writ of Review with the Court of Appeals.
October

17, 1991, this

Court

issued

its amended

On

opinion

remanding the matter to the Board to make additional findings
of fact and to analyze each of the 20 factors enumerated in
Section 35-4-22(j)((5) [35-4-22.3(3)].

(See Appendix E)

September

a

decision)

9,

1992

the

consistent

Board

with

issued

the

Court

of

decision
Appeals

On

(second
Order,

affirming the previous decisions that Tasters' demonstrators
were not independent contractors but were employees.
3

(See

Appendix F)

On October 9, 1992 Tasters filed a Petition for

Writ of Review with this Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Tasters

is

in

the

business

of providing

workers to

brokers and manufacturer representatives for the purpose of
demonstrating
stores.

various

products

Record at 180

"R" refer

to pages

in

grocery

and

department

(All notations hereafter prefixed by

in the record

numerical order in Appendix G.)

and

are

set forth in

Each demonstrator works on an

on-call, part-time basis, with no guarantee of any pctrticular
schedule or number of hours.

R. 222

Jobs are usually only

available however on weekends, the times when grocery and
department stores are at their busiest.

R. 145, 214

Each

demonstrator is free to accept or decline offered assignments
as he or she sees fit.
Tasters
suggestions

gives

R. 145, 151, 222, 223

each

concerning

demonstrator

the

performance

a

two-page
of

their

set

of

duties,

including details such as attire, length of breaks, product
display,

and

demonstration

tactics.

Demonstrators

are

advised not to have children present, smoke, read, or sit
while on the job.
Orientation
demonstrators,

but

(See Appendix H.)
meetings

are

attendance

is

sometimes
not

required.

held
R.

for
218

Sometimes training sessions are set up by Tasters on behalf of
4

brokers to give demonstrators instruction on a new product.
R.

181,

182

Demonstrators

are

manufacturer for those sessions.

paid

by

the

broker

R. 158, 182, 185

or

Those who

do not attend are not selected to demonstrate that specific
product, but are not jeopardized in any other way.
Once

a

demonstrator

demonstration,

he

or

she

communicated by Tasters.

agrees
works

to

do

according

R. 161, 173

a
to

R. 186
particular
a

schedule

The store manager

dictates hours of demonstrations, though the demonstrator can
request minor adjustments in the time frame.

R. 184

demonstrator's

not

monitored

performance

by Tasters.

in

the

store

is

The

closely

In fact, there is little need to

monitor performance as the task required of demonstrators is
straightforward and nontechnical.

R. 186

The store manager

or the broker are aware of what the demonstrators are doing,
however, and can and do make suggestions on how to display or
sell the product.
At

the

end

R. 146
of

each demonstration, demonstrators

are

required to submit a report to Tasters detailing the amount of
product sold.

(See Appendix I)

This information is collected

for the benefit of the broker, but the printed report form
also provides room for store managers to sign off on the
demonstrator's performance.

This is primarily to let Tasters

know that the demonstration was in fact done, but managers can
also make comments about a demonstrator's performance.
5

In

this

way

Tasters

gets

feedback

on

whether

demonstrators performance was satisfactory,

or

not

the

R. 147, 184, 240

The demonstrators are either provided the supplies used
in

demonstrations

supplies.

R.

or

193, 228

requests for expenses.
equipment

such

as

demonstrations.
demonstrations

are

for

the

Tasters approves

R. 215, 232

frying

R. 162
are

reimbursed

pans

expense

of

or disapproves

The demonstrators provide

and

card

tables

for

the

Virtually all items used in the

items the demonstrators already

own so

monetary outlay for each demonstrator in terms of equipment is
minimal.

R. 153, 188

Tasters sometimes provides microwave

ovens and then charges its clients rental fees for their use.
Tasters pays demonstrators by the job and not by the
hour.

R. 204, 209

However, each job is defined by how many

hours the demonstration is supposed to last.

On occasion,

demonstrators have been allowed to leave when all of the
product assigned to them is sold.

R. 174

Generally speaking,

however, if a demonstrator runs out of product, Tasters or the
broker makes an effort to provide the demonstrator with enough
product

to

keep

on

demonstration is over.

working

until

R. 216, 233

the

time

for

the

The demonstration is

considered complete when the time set for the demonstration is
over, not when the product is all sold.
Some demonstrators have delegated assignments to other
demonstrators when the original demonstrator does not want to
6

or cannot do the demonstration he or she is assigned to do,
and

they

are

then

paid

for

the

work.

R.

152

Other

demonstrators, however, call Tasters to provide a replacement
when they cannot complete a demonstration.

R. 170, 171

The demonstrators and Tasters are free to terminate their
relationship with each other at any time.
paid

an

individual

individual's

name

a

is

paycheck

for

automatically

If Tasters has not

over
dropped

computer list of available demonstrators.

a

year,
off

that

Tasters'

R. 231

Although they are free to perform services for other
employers,

none

of

the

demonstrators

offices or obtain business licenses.

advertise,

maintain

R. 167

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Board of Review's findings of fact in this matter
were complete and thorough, each based on substantial evidence
in light of the whole record as required by the Administrative
Procedures Act.

There is not significant disagreement between

the parties regarding the Board of Review's factual findings.
Tasters' challenge of the Board's decision, rather, goes to
the weight the Board of Review chose to give certain factual
findings and the conclusions it reached from its application
of certain facts to the twenty factors outlined in Section 354-22(j)(5) [35-4-22.3(3)] of the Utah Employment Security Act.

7

Section 35-4-22(j)(5) [35-4-22.3(3)] gives the Commission
a broad grant of discretion in deciding which factors are to
be given significant weight in a particular fact situation.
Utah

case

Industrial

law

supports

Commission

the

proposition

has been given

that

where

the

an express grant of

discretion from the Legislature, a reviewing court will grant
deference to the Board of Review decision and will apply the
reasonableness standard of review, i.e. a reviewing court must
affirm Board of Review determinations that are reasonable and
rational.
The Board's weighing of factors and granting significance
to

certain

factors

and

insignificance

to

others

is

reasonable and rational in light of the facts of this case.
The

Board's

applicable

determination
was

responsibility.

entirely

that
in

certain

keeping

factors

with

its

were

not

statutory

The Board of Review's ultimate conclusion

that Tasters' demonstrators are not independent contractors
but

are employees

was reasonable

and rational

within the

meaning of Section 35-4-22(j)(5) [35-4-22.3(3)].
Finally, the Board of Review did not exceed the authority
of this Court's remand, as suggested by Tasters.

8

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE BOARD OF REVIEWS FINDINGS OF FACT SHOULD BE
UPHELD AS THEY ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN LIGHT OF THE WHOLE RECORD.
A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW.

The Petitioner in this case argues that the Board of
Review's

factual findings are inappropriate and should be

overruled by the Court of Appeals since the Board of Review
did not "review the whole record", but merely that portion
which "supports its decision",
16.)

(See Petitioner's Brief, page

To successfully challenge any finding of fact of the

Board of Review on judicial review, however, Section 63-46b16(4)(g), Utah Code Annotated

(1953, as amended), provides

that a party must demonstrate that the findings are "not
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the
whole record before the court"•

See Grace Drilling Company v.

Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 67-68 (Utah App. 1989).
"Substantial evidence" has been defined by this Court as
"such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion."

Dept. of Air Force v.

Swider, 824 P.2d 448 (Utah App. 1991), quoting Grace Drilling
Company

v. Board

of Review, supra, at 67

Drilling case, the Court noted:
9

In the Grace

Substantial evidence is "more than a mere
scintilla of evidence . . . though
•something less than the weight of the
evidence'".
Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, supra, at 68.
A party seeking to overturn an agency factual finding
has

the

burden

of

"marshalling

Drilling, Id, at 68.
the

party

seeking

to

the

evidence".

Grace

The marshalling process requires that
overturn

an

agency

factual

finding

marshal the evidence in support of the
findings and then demonstrate that despite
this evidence, the findings are so
lacking in support as to be inadequate
under the applicable standard of review.
Heinecke v. Department of Commerce, 810 P. 2d 459, 464 (Utah
App. 1991).
Even when the marshalling process of a party seeking to
overturn an agency factual finding reveals evidence to support
a differing version of the facts than that found by the Board
of Review, it is not the province of the reviewing court to
substitute even a credible, persuasive or reasonable version
of the facts presented by an appealing party for that of the
Board of Review.
In undertaking such a review, this court
will not substitute its judgment as
between two reasonably conflicting views,
even though we may have come to a
different conclusion had the case come
before us for de novo review.
[Cites
omitted.]
It is the province of the
lower, not appellate courts, to resolve
conflicting
evidence,
and
where
inconsistent inferences can be drawn from
10

the same evidence, it is for the Board to
draw the inferences. [Citations omitted.]
Grace Drilling Company v. Board of Review, supra, at 68.

See

also Wurst v. Department of Employment Security, 818 P.2d 1036
(Utah App. 1991).
By arguing that the Board of Review erroneously failed to
"review the whole record/' and looked only at that portion
which "supports its decision," Petitioner suggests that the
Board of Review must, in effect, "marshall the evidence" in
reaching

its decision.

responsibility.
reviewed

by

this

The Board of Review has no such

In a workers
Court,

the

compensation
Court

case recently

recognized

that

the

administrative agency is the finder of facts and can choose to
give more weight to certain evidence than other evidence:
As we have previously recognized, the
Commission is the ultimate fact finder in
workers' compensation cases. As the fact
finder, the Commission may choose to give
certain evidence more weight than other
evidence.
See Mollerup Van Lines v.
Adams. 16 Utah 2d 235, 398 P.2d 882
(1965). In Mollerup, the court noted that
"[i]t was both the duty and the
prerogative of the Commission to view [the
doctor's] entire testimony together and it
could believe those statements which
impressed it as being true, even though
there may have been some seeming
contradictions in other parts of his
testimony."
398 P. 2d at 885 (citations
omitted) .
More recently this court has held that the
Commission will not be reversed simply
because it has chosen to rely on one
portion of a medical panel report and to
11

reject other inconsistent portions. See
USX Corp* v. Industrial Commission, 781
P.2d 883, 887 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Virgin v. Bd. of Review of Indus. Com'n, 803 P.2d 1284, 1289
(Utah App. 1990).
B.

THE BOARD'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE COMPLETE
AND SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN
LIGHT OF THE WHOLE RECORD.

While Tasters makes a show of disputing
factual

findings,

substantively

the

Board's

different

from

findings
those

of

the Board's

fact

proposed

by

Tasters' challenge of the Board's findings of
examined

factor by

factor as outlined

are

not

Tasters.

fact, when

in Tasters' Brief,

dispute only the weight the Board chose to give those facts
in determining the existence of independent contractor status
rather than whether crucial, relevant facts were not made part
of the Board's findings of fact.
A

review

of

the

proposed

findings

of

fact

made by

Tasters set out in Appendix D, shows a list of facts that
barely differ from the findings made by the Board of Review.
The essential difference in Tasters' version of the facts from
the

Board's

sometimes

factual
framed

findings

either

as

is that Tasters' facts are
legal

conclusions

or

conclusions drawn from characterization of the facts.
example, Petitioner's proposed Fact number 9 reads:

12

imply
For

Belrose testified she was free to accept
or reject any work and because of that she
considered
herself an
independent
contractor. R. 204, 205.
This

proposed

finding

of

fact

offers

as

fact

a

legal

conclusion made by a demonstrator who was incompetent to draw
such a conclusion.

As such, the Board of Review could not

accept that proposed factual finding.
that she was an independent

The witness' statement

contractor because

she could

accept any work she wanted is of little value to the Board.
Another example of Tasters1 posing legal conclusions as
proposed findings of fact is Proposed Finding of Fact number
23 which states:
Demonstrators have the right to hire,
supervise and pay other assistants. . . .
This statement is both conclusionary and argumentative.
proposed

finding

is not based

The

on a demonstrator's actual

experience but the supposition that a demonstrator could hire,
supervise, or pay assistants, if she chose to do so.

Witness

Colmere offered a conclusion of what she speculated might
happen in certain circumstances.
technically

Obviously, this evidence is

incompetent and also provides little probative

value in determining whether the demonstrators are employees
or independent contractors.
While

there

are

other

examples

of

conclusionary

statements in Petitioner's proposed findings of fact, it is
unnecessary to attack each one.

The point of this analysis is
13

that

the

Board

of

Review

basically

accepts

the proposed

findings of fact of Tasters insofar as those facts are not
self-serving conclusions elicited by Tasters' counsel.

The

Department's characterization of the kind of business run by
Tasters is essentially identical to that described by Tasters
itself.

If there is any particular instance where Tasters

takes real issue with the Board of Review's factual findings,
those findings are based on substantial evidence when viewed
in light of the whole record and should be upheld by this
Court.
POINT II
THE
BOARD
OF REVIEW'S
DETERMINATION THAT
TASTERS' DEMONSTRATORS ARE EMPLOYEES AND NOT
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS
IS
REASONABLE
AND
RATIONAL.
A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW.

Reviewing courts have consistently given deference to
Board of Review decisions involving mixed questions of law and
fact, affirming those decisions if they are reasonable and
rational.

See Depart, of Air Force v. Dept. of Emp. S€>c. , 786

P.2d 1361, 1363

(Utah App. 1990); Johnson v. Department of

Employment Security, 782 P.2d 965, 968 (Utah App. 1989); ProBenefit Staffing v. Board of Review, 775 P. 2d 439, 44 2 (Utah
App.

1989).

Recent decisions have altered the traditional

characterization of an issue as one of a "mixed question of
14

law and fact".

Instead this Court and the Utah Supreme Court

have found that a reviewing court must give deference to an
agency decision if the agency has been given a "legislative
grant of discretion" to make that decision*

See Morton Int'l.

Inc. v. Utah Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991); Tasters
Ltd. v. Dept. of Employment Security, 819 P.2d 361 (Utah App.
1991) .

According to the reasoning of this Court in these

decisions, when there is a statutory grant of discretion,
deference

to

the

agency's

decision

is required,

and

the

reviewing court will uphold the agency determination if it is
reasonable and rational.
This Court has already held, in connection with this very
case, in looking at Section 35-4-22(j)(5) [35-4-22.3(3)] of
the Utah Employment Security Act, that the Legislature has
explicitly granted discretion to the Commission:
. . . in the statute at issue here, the
legislature's use of the language "unless
it is shown to the satisfaction of the
commission," Utah Code Ann. Section 35-422(j)(5)
(Supp.
1989),
"if
the
[Commission determines that the] weight of
the evidence supports that finding," id..
and "considered [by the Commission] if
applicable," id., indicates an explicit
grant of discretion to the Board.
The Board is given latitude under the
statutory language to weigh and analyze
the applicability of each of the twenty
factors to individual facts. The language
in the statute bespeaks a legislative
intent to delegate interpretation of that
statute to the agency.
Given that the
legislature granted discretion to the
15

agency in interpreting Section 35-422(j)(5), it is in a better position than
the court to give effect to the
legislative intent, and therefore, we will
not disturb the Board's decision unless it
is unreasonable.
Tasters Ltd., Id. at 364-365.
B.

(Citations omitted.)

THE BOARD'S APPLICATION OF THE FACTS TO THE
A-T FACTORS WAS REASONABLE AND RATIONAL.

Tasters argues that there was clear error on the part of
the Board of Review in the way the Board of Review ranked the
significance

of

particular

factors

and

the

Board's

characterization of some factucil information as more important
than other information.

Clearly, however, the Legislature

intended that the Board of Review do exactly what the Board
has done in this case.

The clear language of the statute

implies that the only reasonable way to approach the twenty
point test is to acknowledge that some factors apply to the
fact situation more than others and that therefore some of
the factors are more significant than others.
obviously

disagrees

with

the

Board

While Tasters
of

Review's

characterization of the significance of certain factors and
whether the facts as applied to a particular factor tend to
indicate employee status or independent contractor status, the
Board of Review's application of the facts at hand to each of
the factors is not unreasonable and therefore should be upheld
by this Court.
16

Tasters also argues that the Board of Review's decision
is unreasonable because the Board "changed its conclusion in
the application of 11 of 20 factors between the First and
Second Decision."

(Petitioner's Brief page 12)

Tasters fails

to note, however, that characterization of certain factors
changed in the second decision as a result of being analyzed
individually for significance (as required by this Court) as
opposed to being analyzed by grouping factors together as was
done in the First Decision.
Tasters takes issue with the Board of Review's treatment
of twelve of the twenty factors, claiming that the Board
reached unreasonable conclusions and/or incomplete findings of
fact on these factors.

This Brief will therefore address each

of these twelve factors.
1.

Factor E.

Factor E requires the Board to examine

"whether the individual has the right to hire, supervise, and
pay other assistants pursuant to a contract under which the
individual

is responsible only for the attainment

of the

result or the individual hires, supervises, and pays workers
at the direction of the employers".

In the Board's First

Decision, Factor E was grouped into the "third category of
factors" which the Board found related to the issue of whether
"a continuing personal relationship between employer-employee
has been established, or alternately whether the relationship
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was merely

a discrete,

job by

job arrangement,

in which

performance is enforceable under contract law."
When viewing all of these factors together, the Board of
Review held that this category of factors tended to show that
the

relationship

resembles

that

between

of

an

Tasters

independent

and

the

demonstrators

contractor

relationship.

When Factor E was examined independently, the factor was not
found to support an independent contractor relationship but
was found by the Board to be "not helpful" in determining the
legal relationship of Tasters with its demonstrators.
The reason that this factor is not helpful is because
while the record shows that Tasters' demonstrators sometimes
delegate

their

demonstrations

to

others,

there

is

no

indication in the record, other than conclusionary statements,
elicited by Tasters1 counsel, that individual demonstrators
hire,

supervise,

contract

with

or

pay

Tasters.

other
Factor

assistants
E

pursuant

anticipates

a

to

a

factual

situation which is not in effect in the relationship between
Tasters

and

its

demonstrators.

Factor

E anticipates

an

employer giving an assignment to a worker which is then broken
up

for

completion

by numerous

individuals.

There

is no

showing in the record that any of the demonstrator witnesses
hired, supervised or paid assistants pursuant to a contract
with Tasters for an assignment which Tasters expected to be
broken down for completion by numerous individuals.
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Tasters' analysis of this factor in its Brief on pages 18
through 21 apparently sees no distinction between Factor E and
Factor D, but there is a distinction.

Factor E implies an

express understanding between the individual and its hiring
body that the individual will hire others to complete tasks
that the individual could not do alone.
whether

assignments

can

be

Factor D merely asks

delegated.

The

Board's

determination that this factor is not helpful in determining
the legal relationship between Tasters and its demonstrators
is certainly reasonable.
2.

Factor I»

Factor I requires the Board to determine

"whether the individual uses his or her own office, desk,
telephone

or

other

equipment

or

is

employer's direction and supervision".

physically

in

the

Tasters acknowledges

that the Board's findings of fact with regard to this factor
are correct, that the demonstrators neither work at their own
site of business or at Tasters' site of business.

Tasters

disagrees, however, with the Board's conclusion that this
factor is not useful in determining whether the demonstrators
are independent contractors or employees.

Tasters argues that

since the demonstrators are not physically within Tasters'
direction and supervision, that this factor shows independent
contractor status.

This conclusion is unwarranted.

the

situation

unique

work

between

Tasters

Again,
and

its

demonstrators makes the application of this factor useless.
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The factor requires an examination of whether the individual
works at his/her own place of business or at the place of
business of the employer.
is

at

an

independent

In this case, since the work place

brokers1

store,

owned

and

operated

neither by Tasters or by the demonstrators, the Board of
Review reasonably concluded that this factor was not useful in
determining

whether

or not the legal relationship between

Tasters and its demonstrators was that of an employer-employee
or whether its demonstrators were independent contractors.
3.

Factor J.

Factor J requires the Board to determine

"whether the individual is free to perform services at his or
her own pace or perform services in the order or sequence set
by the employer".

Tasters points out that the Board of

Review's First Decision held that Factor J indicated employee
status and that

in the Board's Second Decision the Board

concluded that Factor J was "not helpful".

It should be noted

again that Factor J was grouped with several other factors in
the Board's analysis in its First Decision and that only later
when it was viewed alone, did the Board specify that the
factor was not helpful in reaching its determination that the
demonstrators were employees.
Tasters argues that there is no evidence in the record
that

"there is no pacing", and cites several quotes from

demonstrators

saying

that

they

performing their work.
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set

their

own

pace

in

As explained in its Second Decision, the Board of Review
pointed

out

that

it

makes

no

sense

to

talk

about

the

demonstrators pacing their work as the demonstrators are not
given quotas for product dispersed
result-oriented.

and their work is not

The demonstrators are required merely to

hand out samples during a certain time period.

It was not

unreasonable of the Board of Review with the evidence in the
record of what Tasters1 demonstrators do, to conclude that
there is no pacing involved in the demonstrators1 work and
that the factor therefore is not useful in determining whether
the demonstrators are employees or independent contractors.
This conclusion was not unreasonable nor was it based on
insufficient

factual

information

as

it was

based

on the

demonstrators' own account of their job.
4.

Factor S.

Factor S requires the Board to determine

"whether the individual may not be fired or discharged as long
as he produces a result which meets contract specifications or
may be discharged at any time".
with

Tasters' marshalling

of

The Board of Review agrees

evidence

under

this

factor.

Tasters' contract with its demonstrators is a simple one.
long as a demonstration
paid in full.
Tasters
hours

is completed, the demonstrator is

There is no indication in the record that

ever stopped
and

As

fired

demonstration fee.

a

a demonstration
demonstrator

after the

without

paying

first few
the

full

Since Tasters has no supervisors at the
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work site, there is little to no chance that a demonstrator
would be terminated prior to the completion of his or her
contract

period.

It

is

for

this reason that

the Board

concluded that Factor S is not useful in determining whether
Tasters•

demonstrators

employees.

are

independent

contractors

or

Again, the Board did not unreasonably change the

characterization of this factor between its First Decision and
its Second Decision.

The Board merely clarified the lack of

importance of this factor in its Second Decision when Factor S
was viewed singly as opposed to being analyzed in a group of
factors as was done in the Board's First Decision.
5.

Factor T.

Factor T requires the Board to determine

"whether the individual agrees to complete a specific service,
and

is

responsible

for

its

satisfaction

or

is

legally

obligated to perform the service, or may terminate his or her
relationship with the employer at any time".

The Board's

analysis under Factor T is essentially the same as that under
Factor S.

Because of the short, very simple terms of the

contract between the demonstrator and Tasters, mid-contract
rifts never have and for all practical purposes are unlikely
to occur. The Board of Review was reasonable in concluding
that the facts as applied to this factor were not useful in
determining

whether

the

demonstrators

contractors or employees.
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were

independent

6.

Factor A,

Factor A requires the Board to determine

"whether the individual works his or her own schedule or is
required to comply with another person's instructions about
when, where and how work is to be performed".
with

the

Board

of

Review's

factual

Tasters agrees
findings

that

demonstrators are free to turn down any demonstrations that
they choose, but that if they agree to accept a demonstration,
when and where that demonstration occurs is set not by the
demonstrator but by the broker.

By accepting a demonstration,

the individual demonstrator agrees to demonstrate product for
a certain period of time at certain hours.

The demonstrator

is provided with a list of "Very Important Things To Remember"
from

Tasters.

Important

Tasters

Things

To

argues

that

Remember"

this

are

list

of

suggestions,

"Very
not

requirements and that, therefore, the Board of Review has
unreasonably determined that facts analyzed under this factor
tend to show employee status for the demonstrators.

Any

reasonable person, however, understands that when the entity
that signs your pay check gives you written instructions, they
are requirements of the job, not merely suggestions.
the

individual

demonstrators

are required

to

Because

comply with

either Tasters' or the broker's instructions about when and
where the work is to be performed and because they are given
specific guidelines about how the work is to be performed, it
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was certainly reasonable of the Board of Review to conclude
that Factor A tends to indicate employee status.
7.

Factor B.

"whether

the

requires

no

Factor B requires the Board to decide

individual
specific

uses his or her own methods and

training

from

the purchaser,

or is

trained by an experienced employee working with him or her, is
required

to

take

correspondence

or

other

courses,

attend

meetings, or by other means indicates that the employer wants
the service performed".
While Tasters does not make the classroom or seminar
training

it

provides

mandatory,

Tasters

does

provide

orientation training and specific product training for those
demonstrators who want it.

Tasters argues that since the

brokers pay for this training, it (Tasters) does not provide
training.

Tasters also claims that since training is not

mandatory,

this

shows

the

demonstrators

are

independent

skilled workers who bring their own special previously honed
techniques to their demonstrations.
are without merit.

Both of these arguments

If demonstrators do not need a great deal

of training, it is because the work required of them is riskfree, simple, and non-technical so that most anyone can do it
either

without

instruction

or

with

only

the

instruction

Tasters provides in its list of "Very Important Things To
Remember."

In the case of special new products, training is

provided by Tasters, as Tasters is the provider and organizer
24

even

though

a

broker

pays

for

the

training.

It

was

*

reasonable, therefore, for the Board of Review to conclude
that the facts analyzed under this factor tend to show that
Tasters' demonstrators are employees.
8.

Factor C.

Factor C requires the Board to decide

"whether or not the individual's services are independent of
the success or continuation of a business or are merged into
the business where success and continuation of the business
depends upon those services and the employer coordinates work
with the work of others".
Tasters disingenuously argues that there is no evidence
in the record to show that the success and continuation of
Tasters' business depends on the demonstrators' services or
that Tasters coordinates individual demonstrators' work with
the

work

of

others.

Tasters'

business

is

to

supply

demonstrators to brokers for use in the brokers' stores.

Cohn

testified that Tasters hires only a few office personnel to
coordinate

the work

of

approximately

2,000 demonstrators.

Tasters directs individual demonstrators to go to specific
stores and provide demonstrations.

Tasters does nothing but

coordinate the work of the individual demonstrators to cover
the needs of their client broker stores.

The success and

continuation of its business is entirely dependant upon the
demonstrators' services.

It was therefore reasonable for the

Board of Review to conclude that the facts as analyzed against
25

this

factor

weighed

in favor of employee

status

for the

demonstrators.
9.
"whether

Factor G.
the

Factor G requires the Board to determine

individual

establishes

his

or her

own time

schedule or does the employer set the time schedule".
is no factual dispute with regard to this factor.

There

The Board

concedes that demonstrations are set by the broker stores for
times of highest volume of consumer traffic in their stores.
It is not the individual demonstrators who set the time for
these demonstrations, but Tasters1 own client stores.

While

Tasters does not set the time frame for each demonstration, it
is clear that the individual demonstrators do not either.
Tasters' business is to provide demonstrators as needed to its
customer stores.

Providing this service in a timely fashion

is something Tasters contracts to do for its clients.

The

clients' time demands are therefore assumed by Tasters in
providing its service.

Since Tasters' client stores set the

time frame for demonstrations, it was reasonable of the Board
to conclude that this factor tended to show employee status.
Again, the Board of Review does not dispute Tasters'
characterization of the facts that individual demonstrators
can turn down any demonstration offered to them.

Simply

because they refuse individual jobs does not mean that they
set

the

schedule

demonstrator

for

for Tasters

the

demonstrations.

is convenient,
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Being

a

flexible part-time

work

because

assignments.
demonstrations

demonstrators
They
but

can

cannot,
work

when

turn

down

however,
there

set

are

individual
their

own

demonstrations

available at times that mesh with their own schedules,
10.

Factor M.

Factor M requires the Board to determine

"whether the individual accounts for his or her own expenses
or is paid by the employer for the expenses".
Employer witness, Cohn, testified

on page 215 of the

record:
We were demonstrating tortillas that were
simply to be warmed in a fry pan and
lightly buttered, cut into serving pieces
and sampled; and I got a call from a
demonstrator in Kemmerer, Wyoming, who
said she had used peanut butter and jelly
and was concerned, would she get her
supply money back; and we had talked about
it and I said, "Well, did you sell
tortillas?" and she said nobody would buy
them because people in Kemmerer didn't
know about tortillas at that time, but she
decided to make peanut butter and jelly
sandwiches and then she sold out; and we
just kind of laughed about it and I said,
you know, "I'm sending the bill.
Of
course, you'll be paid, why not?", but
it's a very simple kind of a situation.
What works for you, do it; and if you're
successful, that's all we want is a
successful demonstration for our store,
for our client. . . .
Cohn's testimony raises two interesting points.

First, that

the demonstrators are supposed to be demonstrating tortillas
"warmed in a fry pan and lightly buttered, cut into serving
pieces and sampled", indicates much more specific instructions
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from Tasters to demonstrators than Cohn admitted to in other
portions of her testimony.

More importantly, with regard to

analysis under Factor M, it is clear that Cohn acknowledged
Tasters1
costs.

authority

to

approve

or

Also see record at 526.

disapprove

questionable

The fact that incidental

items and expenses are paid by the broker or the store is not
determinative to the Board in this instance because Tasters is
the one who has control over whether its client pays for the
expenses or not.

It was therefore reasonable for the Board to

conclude that analysis under this factor tends to indicate
employee status.
11.

Factor 0.

Factor 0 requires the Board to determine

"whether the individual has a real, essential, and adequate
investment in the business or has a lack of investment and
depends on the employer for such facilities".

The Board of

Review does not dispute Tasters1 proposed factual finding that
the demonstrators' equipment would cost between $50 and $200
if purchased new.

The demonstrators testified, though, that

they had much of the equipment in their own households prior
to working for Tasters.

R. 153, 188.

It was reasonable for

the Board to find that the facts analyzed under this factor
tend to show that individual demonstrators do not have, as a
rule

a

real

demonstration

essential
business.

and

adequate

Tasters'

investment

calculations

in

the

that

the

demonstrators' outlay for equipment is significant in view of
28

their

income implies that most of the demonstrators spent

$200 to get started up as demonstrators.
out by the record.
significant

This is not borne

Since the demonstrators do not have

investment

in the demonstration

business, and

since they depend on Tasters to send them to a facility where
demonstrations can be performed,

it was reasonable of the

Board to conclude that the facts analyzed under this factor
tend to show employee status.
12.

Factor P.

Factor P requires the Board to determine

"whether the individual may realize a profit or suffer a loss
as a result of services performed or cannot realize a profit
or loss by making good or poor decisions".
Tasters presented no credible evidence that individual
demonstrators enjoyed or had the possibility of making any
financial gains working as demonstrators other than the wage
they

earned

working

the

set

hours

prescribed

for

each

Tasters1 counsel did elicit testimony from a

demonstration.

demonstrator, Colmere

(R. 194), however, that she would be

personally liable for an injury or accident resulting from her
negligence while working as a demonstrator.

Tasters argues

that this testimony demonstrates that individual demonstrators
could

suffer

indicating
demonstrators.

a

loss

by

independent

making

poor

contractor

decisions,
status

thereby

for

the

The testimony admitting personal liability is

a legal conclusion on the part of the witness giving the
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testimony,

a

conclusion

the

witness

has

not

been

shown

qualified to make.

Furthermore, Tasters1 argument on this

point is circular:

Individual demonstrators are independent

contractors as shown by their willingness to assume personal
liability

in

case

of

accidents

and

since

individual

demonstrators are personally liable for injury or accidents
resulting
independent

from

their

work

as

demonstrators,

they

are

contractors as analyzed under Factor P of the

twenty factor test.
Tasters' evidence on this issue is neither competent nor
relevant in establishing that demonstrators can suffer losses
by making poor decisions.

The most significant

facts as

analyzed under this factor are that the record shows that the
only

remuneration

individual

demonstrators

received

from

their demonstrations is their set fee figured on an hourly
basis.

They, therefore, enjoy no profits and suffer no loss

as a result of the services they perform.

The Board of Review

was reasonable in reaching its conclusion that analysis under
this factor tends to establish that individual demonstrators
are employees.
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POINT III
OTHER FACTORS TENDING TO SHOW THAT THE BOARD OF REVIEW* S DECISION WAS REASONABLE AND RATIONAL.
According to the wording of Section 35-4-22(j)(5)
[35-4-22.3(3)], all individuals who enter into agreement to
perform services for wages are presumed to be employees.

The

reason for this presumption rests in the underlying objective
of the Utah Employment Security Act:

to provide financial

stability to the economy itself and to workers who lose their
jobs through no fault of their own,
Employment Security Act.)
Act

(See Section 35-4-2, Utah

For the beneficent results of the

to be accomplished, the majority

covered by the Act.

of workers must be

Therefore, for purposes of the Act, the

employer-employee relationship, the one covered by the Act,
is presumed unless it is clearly shown "to the satisfaction of
the commission" another working relationship exists.

If the

Board is to err in either direction, towards employee status
or independent contractor status, the Legislature has clearly
guided the Board of Review towards erring in favor of finding
employee status.
status

Only in cases where independent contractor

is clearly shown

is the presumption that an employer-
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employee relationship exists to be put aside and the Board to
conclude that an independent contractor relationship exists.1
POINT IV
THE BOARD OF REVIEW DID NOT EXCEED THE SCOPE OF
THE REMAND ORDER FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS, AS
SUGGESTED BY TASTERS.
This Court's objection to the Board's First Decision is
that the Board of Review failed to provide enough factual
information

and

analysis

for

the

Court

of

Appeals

to

determine which factors were considered by the Board to be
significant and which were considered to be insignificant.
"No findings were made as to why some of the factors were
insignificant, while others were considered significant.

This

1

The Board of Review's ultimate decision that Tasters'
demonstrators are employees is not inherently unreasonable, as
claimed by Tasters. Tasters and other demonstration services
that send workers to client stores which are not owned or
operated by the demonstration service continue to argue to the
Board of Review and to this Court that since the demonstrators
are not on their property or under their direction and control
while working, those demonstrators are independent
contractors. But Tasters' arrangement with its demonstrators
is very similar to temporary employment agencies who "lend
their employees to other employers".
Section 35-4-22.1(6) of the Act provides that when the
temporary employment agency or loaning employer delegates its
right to instruct and control its workers to the employers
where the temporary workers work, the worker remains the
employee of the temporary employment agency.
Since a work
situation similar to Tasters' arrangement with its
demonstrators is outlined elsewhere in the Act with the
statutory conclusion that those workers remain the employees
of the loaning employer, this tends to indicate that Tasters'
demonstrators are employees and not independent contractors.
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analysis

was

in

err.11

Tasters

Ltd.

v.

Department

of

Employment Security, supra.. at 367.
This Court therefore remanded the matter to the Board of
Review to make "subsidiary findings made in sufficient detail
on all necessary issues so that we may determine if 'there is
a

logical and

legal basis for the ultimate conclusion1".

Id., at 368.
Tasters argues that the Board of Review did more than
just make subsidiary findings of fact in its Second Decision
and issued an entirely new decision in error.
case.

This is not the

The Board of Review issued the same decision it made

before, i.e. that Tasters1 demonstrators are employees and not
independent contractors.

The Board of Review gave a factor by

factor analysis, however, in its Second Decision to explain
what factors it considered significant and what factors it
considered insignificant in reaching its ultimate conclusion,
as directed by this Court.
Tasters argues repeatedly throughout its Brief that the
Board of Review's Second Decision is inherently unreasonable
because

factors were

shifted with

regard

to

significance

between the First Decision and the Second Decision.

Those

shifts occurred, as already pointed out in this Brief, not
because the Board of Review changed its mind with regard to
particular
instead

of

factors, but

because

when

viewed

individually

as groups of factors, the factors were given
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individual attention and accordingly given their appropriate
significance.
POINT V
THE BOARD OF REVIEW CORRECTLY MADE ITS DECISION
ON THE BASIS OF ITS APPLICATION OF SECTION 35-422(j)(5) [35-4-22.3(3)] WITHOUT REFERENCE TO
PREVIOUS IRS DETERMINATIONS, AS REQUIRED BY LAW.
Tasters reiterates its old argument that the Board of
Review's

decision

contradicted

an

is
IRS

inherently
ruling

independent contractors.

unreasonable

that

the

because

demonstrators

it
were

Tasters argues "it is unreasonable

for a small business to be told by the State that when it uses
the same test as the IRS (which the State followed in creating
the test), that the State came to a different conclusion".
(See page 46 of Petitioners Brief.)

Tasters cites no law,

rule, or precedential case suggesting the Commission is bound
in any way by a previous decision by the Internal Revenue
Service.

The Commission is instead directed to review the

facts as presented before the Administrative Law Judge and to
measure them against the twenty factor test of Section 35-422(j)(5) [35-4-22.3(3)].
Its

decision

This the Board of Review has done.

disregarding

any

previous

IRS

ruling

was

reasonable and rational and should be affirmed by this Court.
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CONCLUSION
The
22(j)(5)

Board

of

Review's

[35-4-22.3(3)]

reasonable and rational.
respectfully

requests

to

application
the

of

facts

of

Section 35-4this

case

was

The Board of Review, therefore,

that this Court

affirm

the

Board's

decision and that Petitioner's request for attorney fees be
disregarded as frivolous.
Respectfully submitted this

day of February, 1993.

EMMA R. THOMAS
Attorney for Respondents
Board of Review of the
Industrial Commission
of Utah, Department of
Employment Security
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I DO HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed four copies of the
foregoing

Respondents'

following this

Brief,

postage

prepaid,

day of February, 1993:
Gary E. Doctorman (0895)
Richard M. Marsh (4088)
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Petitioner
201 South Main Street
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0898
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APPENDIX A (Page 1)

TITLE HI.
REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF ORDERS OF
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES, COMMISSIONS, AND COMMITTEES
Rule 14. Review of administrative orders: how obtained;
intervention.
(a) Petition for review of order; joint petition. When judicial review by
the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals is provided by statute of an order
or decision of an administrative agency, board, commission, committee, or
officer (hereinafter the term "agency" shall include agency, board, commission, committee, or officer), a petition for review shall be filed with the clerk of
the appellate court within the time prescribed by statute, or if there is no time
prescribed, then within 30 days after the date of the written decision or order.
The term "petition for review" includes a petition to enjoin, set aside, suspend,
modify, or otherwise review a notice of appeal or a writ of certiorari. The
petition shall specify the parties seeking review and shall designate the respondents) and the order or decision, or part thereof, to be reviewed. In each
case, the agency shall be named respondent. The State of Utah shall be
deemed a respondent if so required by statute, even though not so designated
in the petition. If two or more persons are entitled to petition for review of the
same order and their interests are such as to make joinder practicable, they
may file a joint petition for review and may thereafter proceed as a single
petitioner.
(b) Statutory and docketing fees. At the time of filing any petition for
review, the party obtaining the review shall pay to the clerk of the appellate
court such filing fees as are established by law, and also the fee for docketing
the appeal. The clerk shall not accept a petition for review unless the filing
and docketing fees are paid.
(c) Service of petition. A copy of the petition for review shall be served by
the petitioner on the named respondent(s), upon all other parties to the proceeding before the agency, and upon the Attorney General of Utah, if the state
is a party, in the manner prescribed by Rule 3(e). The petitioner, at the time of
filing the petition for review, shall also file with the clerk of the appellate
court a certificate reflecting service upon all parties to the agency proceeding
who have been served.
(d) Intervention. Any person who seeks to intervene in a proceeding under
this rule shall serve upon all parties to the proceeding and upon all parties
who participated before the agency, and file with the clerk of the appellate
court a motion for leave to intervene. The motion shall contain a concise
statement of the interest of the moving party and the grounds upon which
intervention is sought. A motion for leave to intervene shall befiledwithin 40
days of the date on which the petition for review is filed.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
0...

f Am. Jur. 2d. — 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrathe Law § 553 et seq.
A.L.R. — Court review of bar examiners' depliion on applicant's examination, 39 A.L.R.3d
tt*
. . .
Standing of civic or property owners associaSon to challenge zoning board decision (as asr-

lar body to appeal reversal of its decision, 13
AL.R.4th 1130.
Judicial review of administrative ruling affecting conduct or outcome of publicly regulated horse, dog, or motor vehicle race, 36
A.L R.4th 1169.

Utah
Employment Security Act
Chapter 35-4

35-4-1

Short Title.
This chapter is known as the "Employment Security Act."

35-4-2

Public Policy.

As a guide to the interpretation and application of this act, the public
policy of this state is declared to be as follows: Economic insecurity due to
unemployment is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the
people of this state. Unemployment is therefore a subject of general interest
and concern which requires appropriate action by the Legislature to
prevent its spread and to lighten its burden which now so often falls with
crushing force upon the unemployed worker and his family. The achievement of social security requires protection against this greatest hazard of
our economic life. This objective can be furthered by operating free public
employment offices in affiliation with a nation-wide system of employment
services, by devising appropriate methods for reducing the volume of
unemployment and by the systematic accumulation of funds during periods
of employment from which benefits may be paid for periods of unemployment, thus maintaining purchasing power and limiting the serious social
consequences of unemployment. The Legislature, therefore, declares that
in its considered judgment the public good, and the general welfare of the
citizens of this state require the enactment of this measure, under the police
power of the state, for the establishment and maintenance of free public
employment offices and for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment
reserves to be used for the benefit of unemployed persons.

5
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SECTION 35-4-10(1), UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT

Appeals to Supreme Court.
(i) Within ten days after the decision of the board of review has
become final, any aggrieved party may secure judicial review by commencing an action in the court of appeals against the board of review for the
review of its decision in which action any other party to the proceeding
before the board of review shall be made a defendant. In that action a
petition which shall state the grounds upon which a review is sought shall be
served upon a member of the board of review or upon that person the board
of review designates. This service is considered completed service on all
parties but there shall be left with the party served as many copies of the
petition as there are defendants and the board of review shall mail one copy
to each defendant. With its answer, the board of review shall certify and file
with the court all documents and papers and a transcript of all testimony
taken in the matter together with itsfindingsof fact and decision. The board
of review may also, in its discretion, certify to the court questions of law
involved in any decision by it. In any judicial proceeding under this section,
thefindingsof the commission and the board of review as to the facts, if
supported by evidence, are conclusive and the jurisdiction of the court is
confined to questions of law. It is not necessary in any judicial proceeding
under this section to enter exceptions to the rulings of the commission or
the board of review and no bond is required for entering the appeal. Upon
final determination of the judicial proceeding, the commission shall enter an
oTder in accordance with the determination. In no event may a petition for
judicial review act as a supersedeas.
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35-4-22
Localized Service Defined.
0) (4) Service is considered to be localized within a state if:
(j) (4) (A) the service is performed entirely within the state; or
(j) (4) (B) the service is performed both within and without the state,
but the service performed without the state is incidental to the individual's
service within the state, for example, is temporary or transitory in nature or
consists of isolated transactions.

ABC Test of Employment.
0) (5) Services performed by an individual for wages or under any
contract of hire, written or oral, express or implied, are considered to be
employment subject to this chapter, unless it is shown to the satisfaction of
the commission that the individual is an independent contractor. The
commission shall analyze all of the facts in Subsections (A) through (T)
under the common-law rules applicable to the employer-employee relationship to determine if an individual is an independent contractor. An individual
is an independent contractor if the weight of the evidence supports that
finding. The following factors are to be considered if applicable:
G) (5) (A) whether the individual works his or her own schedule, or is
required to comply with another person's instructions about when, where,
and how work is to be performed;
0) (5) (B) whether the individual uses his or her own methods and
requires no specific training from the purchaser, or is trained by an
experienced employee working with him or her, is required to take
correspondence or other courses, attend meetings, and by other methods
indicates that the employer wants the services performed;
0) (5) (C) whether the individual's services are independent of the
succsess or continuation of a business, or are merged into the business
where success and continuation of the business depends upon those
services and the employer coordinates work with the work of others;
0) (5) (D) whether the individual's services may be assigned to ot hers,
or must be rendered personally;
0) (5) (E) whether the individual has the right to hire, supervise, and
pay other assistants pursuant to a contract under which the individual is
responsible only for the attainment of a result, or the individual hires,
supervises, and pays workers at the direction of the employer;
(j) (5) (F) whether the individual was hired to do one job and has no
continuous business relationship with the person for whom the services are
performed, or continues to work for the same person year after year;
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35-4-22

(j) (5) (G) whether the individual establishes his or her own time
schedule, or does the employer set the time schedule;
(j) (5) (H) whether the individual is free to work when and for whom he
or she chooses, or is required to devote full-time to the business of the
employer, and is restricted from doing other gainful work;
0) (5) (0 whether the individual uses his or her own office, desk,
telephone, or other equipment, or is physically within the employer's
direction and supervision;
0) (5) (J) whether the individual is free to perform services at his or
her own pace, or performs services in the order or sequence set by the
employer;
(j) (5) (K) whether the individual submits no reports, or is required to
submit regular oral or written reports to the employer;
(j) (5) (L) whether the individual is paid by the job or on a straight
commission, or is paid by the employer in regular amounts at stated
intervals;
0) (5) (M) whether the individual accounts for his or her own
expenses, or is paid by the employer for expenses;
(j) (5) (N) whether the individual furnishes his or her own tools, or is
furnished tools and materials by the employer;
0) (5) (O) whether the individual has a real, essential, and adequate
investment in the business, or has a lack of investment and depends on the
employer for such facilities;
(j) (5) (P) whether the individual may realize a profit or suffer a loss as
a result of services performed, or cannot realize a profit or loss by making
good or poor decisions;
0) (5) (Q) whether the individual works for a number of persons or
firms at the same time, or usually works for only one employer;
0) (5) (R) whether the individual has his or her own office and
assistants, holds a business license, is listed in business directories,
maintains a business telephone, or advertises in newspapers, or does not
make services available except through a business in which he or she has no
interest;
(j) (5) (S) whether the individual may not be fired or discharged as
long as he or she produces a result which meets contract specifications, or
may be discharged at any time; and
0) (5) (T) whether the individual agrees to complete a specific service,
and is responsible for its satisfaction or is legally obligated to perform the
service, or may terminate his or her relationship with the employer at any
time.
82
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35-4-22.1. Employing units.
(1) "Employing unit" means any individual or type of organization including any partnership, association, trust, estate, joint stock company, insurance
company, or corporation, whether domestic or foreign, or the receiver, trustee
in bankruptcy, trustee or successor of any of the foregoing, or the legal representative of a deceased person, which has or subsequent to January 1, 1935,
had one or more individuals performing services for it within this state.
(2) All individuals performing services within this state for any employing
unit which maintains two or more separate establishments within this state
are considered to be performing services for a single employing unit for all the
purposes of this chapter.
(3) Each individual employed to perform or to assist in performing the work
of any person in the service of an employing unit is considered to be engaged
by the employing unit for all the purposes of this chapter whether the individual was hired or paid directly by the employing unit or by the person, provided
the employing unit had actual or constructive knowledge of the work.
(4) "Hospital9* means an institution which is licensed, certified, oir approved
by the Department of Health as a hospital.
(5) "Institution of higher education," for the purposes of this section, means
an educational institution which:
(a) (i) admits, as regular students only, individuals having a certificate
of graduation from a high school or the recognized equivalent of a
certificate;
(ii) is legally authorized in this state to provide a program of education beyond high school,;
(iii) provides an educational program for which it awards a bachelor's or higher degree, or provides a program which is acceptable for
full credit toward that degree, a program of postgraduate or postdoctoral studies, or a program of training to prepare students for gainful
employment in a recognized occupation; and
(iv) is a public or other nonprofit institution.
(b) All colleges and universities in this state are institutions of higher
education for purposes of this section.
(6) (a) 'Temporary services employer" or "leasing employer** is an employing unit that contracts with clients or customers to supply workers to
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UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION

35-4-22.2

perform services for the client or customer and directly or indirectly performs the following functions:
(i) negotiates with clients or customers for matters such as time,
place, type of work, working conditions, quality, and price of the
services;
(ii) determines assignments or reassignments of workers even
though workers retain the right to refuse specific assignments;
(iii) retains the authority to assign or reassign a worker to other
clients or customers when a worker is determined unacceptable by a
specific client or customer;
(iv) sets the rate of pay of the worker whether or not through
negotiation;
(v) pays the worker from its own account; and
(vi) retains the right to hire and terminate workers.
(b) If an individual or entity contracts to supply an employee to per*
form services for a customer or client and is a leasing employer or a
temporary services employer, the individual or entity is the employer of
the employee who performs the services. If the individual or entity is not
a leasing employer or a temporary services employer, it pays the wages as
the agent of the employer.
(c) In circumstances in which an employee is loaned from one employer
to another employer, and direction and control of the manner and means
of performing the services changes to the employer to whom the employee
is loaned, the loaning employer shall continue to be the employer of the
employee if the loaning employer continues to pay the employee, whether
or not reimbursed by the other employer. If the employer to whom the
employee is loaned pays the employee for the services performed, that
employer is considered the employer for the purposes of any remuneration
paid to the employee by that employer, regardless of whether the loaning
employer also pays remuneration to the employee.
History: C. 1953, 35-4-22.1, enacted by L.
1991, ch. 174, I 16.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1991, ch. 174 be-

came effective on April 29, 1991, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
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63-46b-16
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STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL

(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply injudicial proceedings under thia
section.
History: C. 1963,63-46b-15, enacted by L. according to the standards of Subsection
1987, ch. 181, i 271; 1988, ch. 72, J 26.
63-46b-16(4r at the end in Subsection a J S
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- and made minor stylistic changes,
ment, effective April 26, 1988, deleted "except
Effective Dates. - Laws 1987, ch lai
that final agency action from informal a^judi- j 3 1 6 m a k c a ^ a c t effective on Januarvi
cative proceedings based on a record shall be 1933
* *•
reviewed by the district courts on the record
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Function of district court
Section 63-46b-16(l) provides that all final
agency decisions through formal adjudicative
proceedings will be reviewed by the Utah Supreme Court or Court of Appeals. Therefore,

the district court will no longer function as in*
termediate appellate court except to review informal adjudicative proceedings de novo pursuant to Subsection (lXa) of this section. In re
Topik, 761 P.2d 32 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative pro*
ceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court oif Appeals has
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal acjjudicative proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and
copies for the record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
736
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(0 the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
History: C. 1953,63-46b-18, enacted by L. appellate court" in Subsection (2)(a); and substituted "appellate rules of the appropriate api(67f ch. 161, i 272; 1988, ch. 72, 5 28.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- pellate court" for "Utah Rules of Appellate Proment, effective April 25,1988, substituted "As cedure" in Subsections (2)(a) and (2Kb),
provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161,
frurt of Appeals" for 'The Supreme Court or 5 3 1 5 m a k e 8 t h e a c t effective on January 1,
#ther appellate court designated by statute in jggg
9ubsection (1); inserted Vith the appropriate
NOTES TO DECISIONS
function of district court
Subsection (1) provides that all final agency
decisions through formal adjudicative proceed*
lags will be reviewed by the Utah Supreme
Court or Court of Appeals. Therefore, the dia-

trict court will no longer function as intermedin
ate appellate court except to review informal
adjudicative proceedings de novo pursuant to
i 63-46b-15UXa). In re Topik, 761 P.2d 32
(Utah Ct. App. 1988).

63-46M7. Judicial review — Type of relief•
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudicative proceedings by the
district court or the review of formal adjudicative proceedings by an appellate court, the court may award damages or compensation only to the
extent expressly authorized by statute.
(b) In granting relief, the court may:
(i) order agency action required by law;
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as required by law;
(iii) set aside or modify agency action;
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of agency action; or
(v) remand the matter to the agency for further proceedings.
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of final agency action are reviewable by a higher court, if authorized by statute.
History: C. 1953,63-46b«17, enacted by L.
W87, ch. 161, ( 273.
'
'
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. i61,

5 315 makes the act effective on January 1,
1988.
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State of U t a h
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
of the Industrial Commission of Utah
1234 South Main Street • P.O. Box 11800
Salt Lake City. Utah 84147-0800
(801) 533-2231

August 31, 1989

Tasters Ltd Inc.
1381 East 2100 South #B
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105-3753

Dear Ms. Cohn:
This Declaratory Order is in response to a request for a ruling we
received to determine the status of coverage for unemployment purposes of
individuals performing services as in-store product demonstrators beginning
January 1, 1989.
This letter constitutes a formal determination in accordance with the
provisions of the Utah Employment Security Act, Section 35-4-22(j)(5) (see
attachment).
It is the determination of this Department that Beverly Jean
Nelson, Viola Coleman, Eve Baird, Effie Roberts, Pat Colmere, Elayne Belrose and
Clara Ross are employees of Tasters Ltd Inc. as defined by the Utah Employment
Security
Act.
Additionally, other
individuals working under the same
relationship as those above named would also be considered employees.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS;
According to the information we received, Tasters is in the business of
providing personnel on a part-time, on call basis for in-store product
demonstrations. The demonstrators perform their services in retail grocery and
department stores at the request of food brokers, food representatives, and food
principals.
Tasters provides orientation training for the demonstrators and
provides general guidelines for their performance.
The demonstrators are
occasionally given specialized training at the request of the Tasters clients.
Tasters retains the right to change the methods used by the demonstrators to
conform to the clients needs.
The demonstrators cure supervised by Tasters to
insure that they perform their services satisfactorily.
Tasters maintains a list of demonstrators who are willing to perform
product demonstration services on a regularly scheduled basis. The demonstrators
are free to accept or reject any offer of work. However, the demonstrators in
essence are required to follow a routine or schedule established by Tasters, in
that once a demonstrator accepts a job, Tasters dictates the time and place at
which the demonstrator performs the services.
Tasters doss not provide any materials or equipment needed by the
demonstrator.
The demonstrator is required to provide equipment and supplies
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such as a card table, electric frying pan, plastic table
spoons, knives, cutting board,
can openers, extension
reimburses the demonstrators for some of these expenses.
the demonstrators will perform their services personally
helpers.

cloths, apron, tongs,
cord, etc.
Tasters
It is understood that
and do not hire any

The demonstrators perform their services in various retail stores on a
part-time basis.
They are paid on an hourly basis. They are not eligible to
receive any benefits, but Tasters does carry worker's compensation insurance
coverage on them.
Tasters retains the right to discharge the demonstrators in that they
will not contact the demonstrator for another job if the demonstrator does a poor
job. The demonstrators retain the right to terminate their services at any time.
The demonstrators do not have a financial investment in Tasters, or any other
business of a similar nature.

REASONING:
Whether an individual is an independent contractor or em employee is
determined upon consideration of the facts and the application of the law in each
case.
The twenty factors referred to in the section of the Utah Employment
Security Act noted in the first paragraph of this letter (see attachment) are
used to determine whether there is sufficient control present to establish an
employer-employee relationship. Each factor is to be "weighted11 according to the
degree of it's importance depending on the occupation and the actual context in
which services are performed.
If the relationship of an employer and employee exists, the
designation or description of the parties as anything other than that of employer
and employee is immaterial. Thus, if such relationship exists, it is of no
consequence that the employee is designated as a partner, agent, independent
contractor, or the like. Any verbal or written agreement which labels a worker
in any of the above mentioned categories, when the relationship is essentially
employment, effectively waives an individual\s rights to unemployment insurance
benefits. Such agreements are considered void pursuant to Section 35-4-}8(a) of
the Utah Employment Security Act.
Also, the Utah Supreme Court has stated in
numerous decisions that
such
agreements
whether
verbal or written
are
ineffective in removing an individual from the protection of the Utah Employment
Security Act when by their own actions they bring themselves within (Leach vs.
Industrial Commission 123 Utah 423 260 P.2d. 477 1953 and Creameries of America
vs. Industrial Commission 98 Utah 571 102 P.2d. 300 1940).
We have also reviewed the specific letter of exemption from the
Internal Revenue Service concerning the services of Lynda Jones. Such a letter
of exemption is of value to this Department in providing some direction in our
review prior to the issuance of a Declaratory Order. However, in this case, as
far as we can tell, the ruling has application to only one individual, it is
dated in 1986 and there is no back-up information on file with the Internal
Revenue Service for more detailed review. The ruling is issued based only on the
facts presented to the Internal Revenue Service by the employer, without further
research, follow-up questioning or field work.
Such a ruling is classified by
the IRS as "static" and subject to change at any time if or when additional
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information is made available. In keeping with the intent of the Administrative
procedures Act related to Declaratory Orders, it is incumbent upon the
Department to conduct a full and proper investigation prior to the issuance of
such an order.
Based on our review of the information provided in the questionnaires
completed by the demonstrators and by Tasters it is the conclusion of the
Department that the services of the demonstrators are in employment because:
The demonstrators are "... required to comply with another person's
instructions about when where and how work is to be performed;11 and are
"...trained by an experienced employee working with him or her..." because the
demonstrators are given instructions by Tasters on the manner the work is to be
performed, the location, date and time. Additionally, Tasters provides initial
orientation training and general guidelines for performance of the demonstrators,
35-4-22(j)(5)(A&B).
The "
success and continuation of the business depends upon those
services..." because the demonstrators represent Tasters to the food brokers or
representative. The services are performed for the food broker by Tasters Ltd.
and not for the food broker by the individual demonstrator, 35-4-22(j)(5)(C).
The services of the demonstrators "...must be rendered personally;" and
the demonstrators do not "..[have] the right to hire, supervise, and pay other
assistants...". It may be the intent of Tasters to allow the demonstrators such
latitude, but the information we received indicates this does not happen, nor is
it possible, 35-4-22(j)(5)(D&E).
Oral and/or written reports are required of the demonstrators by
Tasters, 35-4-22(j)(5)(K).
The demonstrators are "...paid by the employer in regular amounts at
stated intervals;" and are "...paid by the employer for expenses;" because they
are paid on an hourly basis for the work performed and reimbursed for the
expenses of supplies incurred in their work, 35-4-22(j)(5)(L&M),
The demonstrators do not have "...a real, essential, and adequate
investment in a business..." of their own nor do they have an investment in
Tasters Ltd and, therefore, cannot assume the risk of realizing*a profit or
suffering a loss either from the investment in their own business or an
investment in Tasters Ltd. Additionally, the demonstrators make their services
available through Tasters Ltd., in which they have no interest, 354-22(j)(5)(0,P&R).
The demonstrators "...may be discharged at any time;" by Tasters and
the demonstrator "...may terminate his or her relationship with the employer at
any time", 35-4-22(j)(5)(S&T).

CONCLUSION:
It is evident from the information received the demonstrators are free
to perform services for other employers at the same time as their employment with
Tasters, are free to accept or decline an offer of work, and are not employed on

APPENDIX B (Page 4)
Tasters Ltd. Inc.

Page 4

a full time basis with Tasters. Additionally, the demonstrators furnish their
own tools in the performance of their work.
These are evidences of an
independent contractor. However, the weight of the twenty factors clearly falls
with the interpretation of employment.
The freedom the demonstrator has to
accept or reject work and to pursue other occupational endeavors could be deemed
to be characteristic of this type of work.
The tools furnished by the
demonstrator are incidental to their service.
They are tools common to most
households and as such do not require a significant separate investment to obtain
and maintain. Because of this, these evidences of independent contractor status
are not weighted as heavily as those defining employment.
If you are not in agreement with this determination you have the right
to appeal. If you choose to appeal this determination, the appeal must be in
writing, be received within ten (10) days of the date of this letter, and define
the reason for the appeal and the relief requested. The appeal should be sent to
PO Box 11800, Salt Lake City, Utah 84147.

Sincerely,

John Levanger
Status Supervisor
34:JL/jm
c:tasrule.jl&
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DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
Appeals Tribunal
Decision of Administrative Law Judge

Employer No.

Tasters Ltd., Inc.
ATTN: Sandi Cohn
1381 East 2100 South, Suite B
Salt Lake City, UT 84105

APPEAL FILED:

September 1, 1989

APPEARANCES:

Appellant, Department
Representative, Witnesses

Case No.

DATE OF HEARING:

PLACE OF HEARING:

1-117373-0
89-A-4044-T

January 30, 1990
April 4, 1990
Salt Lake City

ISSUE:
The Department's declaratory ruling dated August 31, 1989 held food demonstrators
to be employees for the purposes of unemployment insurance coverage.
Sections 35-4-22(j)(1), 35-4-22(p) and 35-4-22(j)(5)
Security Act are quoted on the attached sheet.

of

the

Utah

Employment

Jurisdiction for this review is established in accordance with Section 35-4i:;r; c: tne Utar. Employment Security Act and tne Rules pertaining thereto.

FINDINGS OF FACT:
Tne Utar: Department of Employment Security previously held food demonstrators
working for Tasters, appellant, to be employees.
The determination was upheld
through the appeal process.
The appellant began reporting tc tne IRS and the
Department.
The appellant then requested a ruling in regards to the status of
food demonstrators. The appellant completed a SS-8 Questionnaire and submitted
it to tne IRS along with a list of demonstrators. Based upon this information,
the IRS determined the demonstrators to be non-employees. The IRS does not have
copies of the questionnaires submitted by the appellant. The appellant did not
keep a copy of the form which was submitted.
The appellant maintained a working
copy of a form which was used to complete the actual SS-8 which was submitted to
the IRS. Pursuant to Section 530 of the Internal Revenue Code, once the IRS has
determined a service to be exempt, the IRS is prevented from any other subsequent
redeterminations.
The Utah Employment Security Act underwent a change in 1989 eliminating the
It was replaced by language
historical "AB" test of Section 3S-4-22(j)(5).
similar to the IRS regulation in regards to common law employment. Since the IRS
exempted the demonstrators and the Utah Employment Security Act had been changed,
the appellant petitioned the Department for a new determination. The Department
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obtained a list of demonstrators
Department
randomly selected
some
questionnaire regarding the services
Department received questionnaires
demonstrators, the Department issued
employees.
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from the appellant.
From the list, the
of the demonstrators and sent them a
they performed for the appellant. After the
submitted by the appellant and selective
a decision holding the demonstrators to be

The appellant operates a business of providing personnel (demonstrators) on a
part-time on-call basis to perform food demonstrations, etc. within grocery
stores, etc. The appellant contracts with food brokers, manufacturers, grocery
stores, etc. to demonstrate food, various products, etc. The appellant maintains
a list of individuals who are willing to perform the demonstrations.
As the
appellant obtains contracts, the appellant calls the demonstrators inquiring
whether the demonstrator would be interested in performing a particular
demonstration. The demonstrator is free to accept or reject the assignment.
When
a demonstrator accepts an assignment, the appellant
furnishes the
demonstrator with the information provided by the food broker, etc., as to what
product is to be demonstrated, how, where the demonstration is to take place,
etc.
The demonstrator is often referred to grocery store managers or a food
broker for instructions.
The appellant pays the demonstrator $40.00 for an eight hour demonstration and
$20.00 for a four hour demonstration.
If the product being demonstrated sells
out, the demonstrator is allowed to leave and receives pay for a full day. The
grocery store or the food broker determines the hour and days of the
demonstration and the location within the store for the demonstrator.
The
product is furnisned by the food broker or the store who contracts with the
appellant. The appellant generally furnishes supplies sue)- as plates, napkins,
toctnric/.s, cups, etc. tc be usee ir. tne demonstration. T^e appellant bills tne
broKer for these supplies in addition for payments mace to the demonstrators. If
the demonstrator incurs any expense for supplies, the appellant reimburses the
demonstrator.
The appellant furnishes the demonstrators a list of items of "Very Important
Things To Rememoer". The appellant admonishes the demonstrators to read the list
of things to rememoer and review "training materials often".
The list also
itemizes the equipment the demonstrators shouia nave and some "No-No's".
Equipment needed generally consists of a folding table, table cloth, fry pan,
utensils, apron, etc. which are commonly found in households. The appellant or
food broker furnishes larger items such as microwave ovens and pizza ovens.
The appellant provides the demonstrator with a report to be completed at the end
of the demonstration. The store manager or equivalent must sign the report. In
the report, the demonstrator
reports various
information concerning the
demonstration. Occasionally, the food broker or manufacture representative will
furnish the demonstrator with reports asking more detailed information concerning
the demonstration. The food broker will also require the appellant to assemble a
meeting with the demonstrators so that a representative can instruct and train
tne demonstrators how the product is to be prepared and presented to the
customer.
The demonstrators receive pay for attending the meeting.
The
appellant conducts the meeting and the demonstrators practice demonstrating the
product.
The appellant provides training for those who have not previously
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demonstrated or when a product to be demonstrated is new or different. During
the meetings the broker or representative will instruct the demonstrator as to
what dialogue is to be used, etc.
The appellant has a field manager who visited the demonstrators to check in on
the demonstration, deliver supplies, answer questions, etc. A representative for
the broker will often visit the demonstration site checking the set-up,
instructing the demonstrator as to presentation, etc. The store manager may also
check on the demonstrator and often makes comments on the demonstrators report as
to the demonstrators performance, etc., i.e. "great job, send her back".
The demonstrators are free to work for other demonstration companies. Some of
the demonstrators do so while others are content with working only for the
appellant.
If the appellant receives feedback from a store, broker, etc. that a
demonstrator is unsatisfactory, the appellant ceases to provide that demonstrator
with any future assignments.
If a demonstrator is unable to keep a scheduled demonstration, the demonstrator
either calls the appellant to obtain a new substitute or the demonstrator may
arrange for a substitute.
The substitute submits the report and the appellant
pays the substitute.
There are occasions when the demonstrator will pay the
substitute. The demonstrator is free to hire helpers, however, there is only one
example of such occurring, otherwise the helpers are primarily substitutes. The
one exception is a demonstrator in Price.
Of eight questionnaires completed by the demonstrators, all indicated that they
were supervised or instructed and received training from either the appellant or
food brokers.
All indicated they worked under the appellant's business name.
Question Ql of the questionnaire inquires whether the demonstrator performed the
same services for otners.
?wc o: the eight answered "yes".
Tne same two
individuals also indicated m a t they did not consider themselves to be selfemployed.
Question Q2 of the questionnaire inquires whether they consider
tneriseives self-employed.
Four of the eight answered "yes", and the same four
responded they do not perform similar work for others. All eight demonstrators
reported that they worKed scheduled hours.
Seven responded that they were
required to personally perform the work and all responded they did not have a
helper.
None of the demonstrators responded that they have a business license,
business cards, etc.

REASONING & CONCLUSION OF LAW:
The appellant alleges that the demonstrators are independent contractors.
Although the appellant considers their, to be so, the actual service relationship
determines the employment status rather than any label placed upon the individual
performing the service. Any verbal or written agreement which labels a worker as
an "independent contractor", when the relationship is essentially employment,
effectively waives an individual's rights to unemployment insurance benefits.
Such agreements are considered void pursuant to Section 35-4-18(a) of the Utah
Employment Security Act.
Also, the Utah Supreme Court has stated in numerous
decisions that such agreements whether verbal or written are ineffective in
keeping an individual without the purview of the Utah Employment Security Act
when by their own actions they bring themselves within (Leach vs. Industrial
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Commission 123 Utah 423 260 P.2d. 477 1953 and Creameries
Industrial Commission 98 Utah 571 102 P.2d. 300 1940).

of

America

vs.

Payment for services may constitute a wage for employment. Wages are defined by
Section 3-4-22(p) of the Utah Employment Security Act as any remuneration for
personal services, including commissions. Employment as defined by Section 35-422(j)(l) of the Utah Employment Security Act comprises any service performed for
wages or under any contract of hire, written or oral, expressed or implied. The
Utah Supreme Court in Blamires vs. Board of Review (Utah 584 P.2d. 889 1978)
states "Contract of Hire" is "construed to include any agreement under which one
person performs personal services at the request of another who pays for these
services.
In Fuller Brush vs. Industrial Commission (99 Utah 97 107 P.2d. 201
1940) and also in Superior Cablevision vs. Board of Review (Utah 688 P.2d. 444
1984) the court explained "if an individual renders personal services and was
entitled to remuneration based on and measured by such personal services, the
person performing the service was under a contract of hire".
The demonstrators in question worked for the appellant performing a personal
service. They received payment for their services. The demonstrators received
pay of $40.00 for an eight hour day.
This is essentially work based on an
hourly rate of $5.00 per hour. However, in either event, paid by the day or the
hour, the Tribunal finds the payment to be wages.
In accordance to the
definition of wages and employment as cited herein, the Tribunal concludes the
demonstrator performed a personal service for a wage.
Wages for employment are subject to unemployment insurance coverage unless the
service or employment is specifically excluded by statute or the employer who
employs the service in question can demonstrate the service is not employment
under common law, as stated ir. Section 35-4-22(3) (5) of the Utah Employment
Security Act. T n s sectior. Historically provided a two-prong "A£r Test, but was
replaced by the common law standard used by the IRS as provided by the Internal
Revenue Code and regulation. Tr,e IRS Code states tnat a service is employment if
the employer directs and controls tne service or has the right of control. The
Internal Revenue Regulations provide 20 factors as a common guideline in
determining a common law relationship.
The degree of importance of each factor
varies depending upon the occupation involved and the factual context in which
tne services are performed (Revenue Ruling 87-41, 1987-23 IR8.7). Tfius, a few
factors which exhibit a common law employment relationship may outweigh the
remaining factors.
Therefore, one cannot simply say that 12 or more of the
factors exhibit non-employment and De held so.
The Utah Legislature changed the Unemployment Insurance Act such that it would
more closely follow the guidelines of the IRS.
Although the IRS uses the A-T
factors only as guidelines, the Legislature, for whatever purpose, chose to list
the guidelines as part of the law. However, in doing so, the law is silent as to
how the guidelines or the A-T Test is to be measured and weighed in each
instance. Despite this problem the language definitely implies that the factors
are to be considered under the common law rules applicable to the employeremployee relationship which would be consistent with the manner in which the IRS
reviews possible employment relationships. In light of this, the Tribunal finds
the employer's argument that the majority of the A-T factors are met is without
merit. The test to be determined is whether a common law relationship exists and
in determining such the 20 factors should be considered as guidelines.
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The appellant argues since the IRS has issued a SS-8 ruling stating Linda Jones
to be exempt and the refunding by IRS of employment taxes paid by the appellant,
that the Department then should also exempt the demonstrators.
The Tribunal
finds this argument also to be without merit. The SS-8 ruling is conclusionary.
It does not state the facts that were considered in the formation of the
conclusion.
The evidence the appellant has provided in support of the SS-8
ruling is a work copy at best and must be considered hearsay wherein the contents
of such are refuted by testimony of witnesses and information obtained from
independent questionnaires submitted by the demonstrators whose services are in
question. Further, the IRS determination may be faulty and the IRS, by their own
law - Section 530, is prevented from reversing their determination. Although the
IRS is bound by the ruling that they issue, there is no law, rule or otherwise
which binds the Department of Employment Security to accept the SS-8 ruling when
determining an employment relationship.
A review of various revenue rulings and private rulings unquestionably portray
the IRS considers food demonstrators to be employees.
(Revenue rulings 68-367
C.B. 1968-2, 435; 54-471 C.B. 1954-2, 235; 54-471, C.B. 1954-1, 348; 70-630,
1970-2 C.B. 229; 8741, 1987-23 l.R.B. 7.)
The Tribunal
finds the aforementioned
revenue rulings considerably more
applicable to the services in question than the reverue rulings which the
appellant provided as guidelines.
The IRS has specifically referred to the
aforementioned rulings in issuing private rulings concerning food demonstrators'
services.
(IRS letter rulings 8721108, February 12, 1987; 8830024, April 28,
1988, 8838068, June 29, 1988; 8840015, July 8, 1988 and 8840019, July 7, 1988).
Tne facts of these private rulings are remarkably similar, if not identical, to
tne facts presented herein.
Each of these private rulings specifically cites
Revenue Ru.ir,c 7L-t3* wnerejr. ar employee ser\ice company provides services of
temporary sales clerxs in retail stores. In this ruling the IRS held the sales
clerks tc oe employees
Tne Tribunal finds the facts and ideology of tnis case
to be very conparaDle to the issue currently being considerea. Tnerefore, upor
reviewing the facts of this case, in reference to the revenue rulings of the IRS,
wnc uses the same A-T guidelines as provided in the Utah statute, the Tribunal
concedes the services performed by the demonstrators, are performing a service
for a wage constituting employment under common law.
The TriDunal also makes additional remarks in regards to the application of the
common law test as it pertains to this case. As previously stated, an individual
is an employee if there is a common law relationship.
The appellant has
sufficient control and a right of control over the food demonstrators to hold a
common law relationship.
This is established by the appellant providing the
demonstrators with training, instructions, etc.
The appellant argues that the
control comes through the broker or the store that requests the demonstrators.
However, the appellant provides such entity with the right to control by virtue
of the contract between the appellant and the broker. If the services are not
performed as requested by the broker, the appellant is responsible for the
demonstrator's services due to the contract the broker has with the appellant.
Further, if the demonstrator's services are inadequate, the appellant effectively
discrarges the demonstrator by no longer providing assignments to that particular
demonstrator.
I II If I M l _
00033^
w
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The appellant's business is not substantially different than SOS Temporary
Service,
Kelly Girls, Manpower, etc. However, like Accountemps and others, they
specialize
in providing
personnel
to perform
a specific
service, food
demonstration. In that regard, the demonstrators are highly integrated into the
appellant's business. Without the continual services of the demonstrators the
appellant cannot operate her business. In the IRS Rulings previously mentioned,
this factor was specifically addressed exhibiting the demonstrators were an
integral part of the appellant's business rather than pursuing an independent
trade or business of their own.
In this case, this has been portrayed by the
answers of the demonstrators who completed the questionnaires.
Half of the
respondents did not consider themselves as self-employed established in an
independent trade of food demonstrating.
The half that claimed they were, did
not perform similar services for others nor had any indication of being selfemployed, i.e. having business licenses, business cards, etc.
Each responded
they worked under Tasters name representing the appellant rather than themselves.
Even though some of the demonstrators may work for the appellant and the
appellant's competitors, such does not make them an independent contractor any
more than a worker who affiliates himself with and obtains work wherever
available from SOS, Manpower, etc.
The evidence provided revealed the possibility of one individual in Price who
hires and pays individuals at a lesser rate and then obtains contracts or
assignments from tne appellant and then reassigns the assignments to others.
This may appear as a subcontractor.
However, such may be constructive
employment.
The purported individual was not available for testimony and the
evidence presented in regards to this individual is insufficient to determine her
independence. It may be possible this individual would also be an employer. The
Department needs to specifically investigate the circumstances of this particular
individual if requested by the appellant. The Tribunal finds this individual to
oe ar. exception to tne typical relationship of tne otner demonstrators working
for tfie appellant as portrayed by the evidence herein. Further, the employer has
the D-rder, tc provide evidence tc prove this individual's exclusion.
The
evidence in regarcs to this individual is inadequate for separate consideration
apart from the other demonstrators being considered and has not been specifically
addressed by the Department.
Also, the fact a demonstrator may obtain a
substitute is immaterial and does not, in itself, exhibit an independent
contractor relationship.
The appellant is aware of such and allows the
demonstrators to obtain their own substitute alleviating a problem of the
appellant having to obtain substitute demonstrators themselves.
The Tribunal has given consideration to the A-T factors in conjunction with the
common law relationship.
Based upon the Findings of Fact of this case and in
light
of the revenue rulings aforementioned, the Tribunal concludes the
demonstrators performed a service for a wage constituting employment at common
law sucject to unemployment insurance coverage pursuant to Section 35-4-22(j)(5)
of the Utah Employment Security Act.

DECISION:
Tne Tribunal affirms the Department's declaratory decision dated August 31, 1989
holding food demonstrators who performed a service for the appellant did so for a

000336
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wage constituting employment under common law pursuant to Sections 35-4-22(j)(1),
35-4-2?(p) and 3S-4-22(j)(5) of the Utah Employment Security Act.
Note, the Tribunal believes one individual who works in Price may be excludable.
Since the evidence in regards to this individual is insufficient to make such a
declaration by the Tribunal, the appellant may, if desired, request the
Department to investigate the status of this individual and issue a decision.
Otherwise, without adequate evidence to the contrary, the Tribunal finds this
individual to be no different than the other demonstrators discussed herein.

77^ 0'/?j&?L\
Kenneth A. Marjor
Administrative liaw Judge
APPEALS tiOUNAL
This decision will become final unless within thirty (30) days from April 18,
1990, further written appeal is made to the Board of Review (P. 0. Bex 11600,
Salt Lake City, Utan 84147) setting forth grounds upon which the appeal is made.
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:
:

Case No.

:

DECISION

:

Case No.

90-A-4044-T

90-BR-167-T

DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
Tasters Ltd, Inc. appeals the decision of the Administrative Law
Judge in the above entitled matter, which held Tasters to be subject to the
Utah Employment Security Act with respect to its employment of "demonstrators". Specifically, the ALJ ruled the demonstrators could not be classified
as independent contractors under §35-4-22(j)(5) of the Act.
After careful consideration of the record and Tasters' contentions
on appeal, the Board of Review finds that the demonstrators 1n question do
not meet the criteria of §35-4-22(j)(5) for independent contractors. The
Board of Review therefore affirms the decision of the ALJ and holds the
demonstrators to be 1n the employ of Tasters and subject to coverage under
the provisions of the Utah'Employment Security Act.
Based upon its review of the record, the Board of Review makes the
following findings of fact: Tasters is in the business of providing workers to
brokers and manufacturers* representatives for the purpose of demonstrating
various products in grocery and department stores. Each demonstrator works
on an on-call, part-time basis with no guarantee of any particular schedule or
number of work hours. Each demonstrator is free to accept or decline offered
assignments as he or she sees f i t .
Tasters gives each demonstrator a two-page set of written instructions governing the performance of their duties, including details such as
attire, length of breaks, product display, and demonstration tactics. Demonstrators are prohibited from having children present, smoking, reading or
sitting while on the job. Orientation and other training sessions are sometimes held for demonstrators, but attendance is not required. Payment for
attendance at such meetings is made by Tasters1 client brokers or manufacturers.
Once a demonstrator accepts a particular assignment, he or she must
report for work according to a set schedule. The demonstrators' performance
in the store may be monitored by Tasters1 field representative or by Tasters'
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clients. Vhile individualized supervision is not generally provided, the
field representative and clients give instruction when necessary. At the end
of each demonstration, demonstrators ar$ required to submit a report to
Tasters.
The demonstrators are either provided the supplies used in demonstrations or are reimbursed for the expense of such supplies. The demonstrators provide equipment such as frying pans and card tables at their own
expense. Tasters sometimes provides microwave ovens, then charges its clients
rental fees for their use.
Demonstrators are paid on a "per day" basis. Occasionally, demonstrators delegate assignments to other demonstrators, who then are paid for
the work. Tasters carries warker's compensation insurance on the demonstrators
but provides no other fringe benefits and does not withhold payroll taxes from
demonstrators* paychecks.
The demonstrators and Tasters are free to terminate their relationship with each other at any time. Demonstrators perform theiir services
under Tasters1 business name. Although they are free to perform services for
other employers, none advertise, maintain offices or obtain business licenses.
In judging whether the foregoing facts substantiate Tasters' position that its demonstrators are independent contractors, the Board of Review
is guided by §35-4-22(j)(5) of the Utah Employment Security Act, which provides in material part as follows:
Services performed by an individual for wages or under any
contract of hire, written or oral, express or implied, are
considered to be employment subject to this chapter unless it
is shown to the satisfaction of the commission that the individual is an independent contractor.
The commission shall
analyze all of the facts in Subsections (A) through (T) under
the common-law rules applicable to the employer-employee relationship to determine i f an individual is an independent
contractor. An individual is an independent contractor if the
weight of the evidence supports that finding.
The following
ing factors are to be considered i f applicable.
(Factors A
through T follow, but have been ommitted due to their length.)
Under §35-4-22(j)(5), above, wages paid to an individual for personal services
are subject to unemployment insurance contributions unless the services are
performed by an independent contractor.
§35-4-22(j)|5] establishes 20
separate factors for assessing whether status as an independent contractor
exists, i t also recognizes that each factor may not be pertinent in every case
and should be considered only i f applicable.
To understand and apply
§35-4-22(j)(5) , s 20 factors, i t is necessary to understand their development
in the Act.
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Prior to April 24, 1989, §35-4-22(j)(5) used a two-part test to
determine independent contractor status.
First, the individual performing
services must be free from control and direction from the party for whom the
services were provided. Second, the individual performing services must be
independently established in an occupation, trade or business of his own.
However, because the Internal Revenue Service also made determinations of
independent contractor status using only the test of Mcontrol and direction",
a lack of conformity existed between determinations of the Department and
Internal Revenue Service. To increase conformity, the Legislature repealed
the two part test of §35-4-22(j)(5) and replaced i t with a test that relied
upon 20 factors the IRS had identified as generally significant in determining
"control and direction".
In summary, §35-4-22(j)(5) l s two-part test of
freedom from control and direction and independent establishment in business
was replaced by a 20-part test focusing on control and direction.
§35-4-22(j)(5) as amended recognizes that not each of its 20 factors (A through T) will apply in every situation. §35-4-22(j)(5) further
recognizes the necessity of "weighing" factors according to their significance
under the facts of a particular case. The Board of Review must therefore
identify those factors which are signficant in the present case, then determine whether the evidence with respect to those factors establish the freedom
from control and direction necessary to support a finding of independent contractor status.
Factors A, B, 6, J and K relate to the amount of direct control
exercised over the individual in the performance of his or her duties. As
the extent of control over details increases, an indiviudual will be more
likely to be considered an employee. In this case, Tasters tells its demonstrators when to report for work, when to leave, and how long to spend on
breaks and lunch. It tells them to remain standing, not to smoke, not to
have children with them, and not to read. Demonstrators are instructed on
proper dress and personal demeanor. The foregoing is only a sample of the
detailed instructions Tasters gives its demonstrators. While Tasters is not
staffed to the extent that such matters can be closely observed, Tasters has
nonetheless exercised its right to give the instructions. The Board of
Review concludes the foregoing factors strongly support a finding that Tasters
exerts control and direction wer the demonstrators.
A second group of factors, C, F, H, 0, P, Q and R, pertain to the
degree of independence and separation existing between the individuals performing services and the entity for which services are performed. A high
degree of separation tends to establish an independent contractor relationship while integration indicates an employment relationship. Due to the
unique nature of Tasters1 business, the Board considers mary of the factors
in this category to be of l i t t l e significance. For example, Tasters' business
does not require full-time employees or a high degree of contact with its
demonstrators. Nor does i t require or permit a substantial investment in
equipment. However, the Board does consider factor R to be significant. The
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demonstrators had not taken the steps to estaablish independent business
activity that an independent contractor would be expected to take. In conclusion, most factors in this category are not significant in evaluating
Tasters1 control over its demonstrators, except factor R, which supports the
finding that the demonstrators were not independent contractors.
The third category of factors, items D, E, L, S and T, relate to
the issue of whether a continuing personal relationship between employer and
employee has been established, or alternatively, whether the relationship was
merely a discrete, job-by-job arrangement in which performance is enforceable
under contract law. Certain of the factors in this category are significant
to this case and support a finding of independent contractor status* For
example, Tasters permitted the demonstrators to delegate assignments to
others and compensated demonstrators on a Hper job" basis. On balance, the
nature of the legal relationship between Tasters and the demonstrators resembles that of an independent contractor relationship.
The last category of factors, items I, M and N,- focus on the demonstrators' investment in equipment and the allocation of expenses between the
demonstrations and Tasters. These factors are not useful under the circumstances of this case since equipment requirements are minimal and expenses
are reimbursed by Tasters' clients.
In sunnary, the 20 factors of §35-4-22(j)(5) have been evaluated by
the Board of Review and classified into four general groups. The f i r s t group
relates to the amount of direct control exercised by Tasters, while the
second group pertains to the extent of integration of the demonstrators Into
Tasters1 business.
In light of the facts of this case, both categories
indicate that the employment relationship between Tasters and Its demonstrators is that of emplqyer and employees. While the third group of factors,
pertaining to the legal relationship between Tasters and its demonstrators,
favors a contrary conclusion and the fourth group, pertaining to allocation
of expenses and investment, is neutral, the first and second categories are
the most significant to this case.
The Board of Review concludes that
the weight of the evidence when viewed under the standards set forth in
§35-4-22(j)(5) (A) through (T) does not support a finding that Tasters1
demonstrators are independent contractors. The Board of Review therefore
holds that they are in employment subject to the provisions of the Utah
Employment Security Act.
Two additional points in Tasters' appeal require brief discussion.
First, Tasters argues that the questionnaire prepared by the Department and
completed by Tasters demonstrators should have been excluded from the record
because they lacked statistical validity, were not understood by the demonstrators and contained questions which did not conform to the 20 factors set
forth in §35-4-(22)j)(5). The questionnaires are insignificant to the Board
of Review's decision in this matter, since the Board of Review relied instead
upon the demonstrators' testimony from the appeal hearing, given under oath
and subject to cross-examination. Even i f the questionnaires were removed
from the record, the Board of Review's decision would remain unchanged.
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The second point requiring response is Tasters' contention that a
previous informal IRS determination that one of Tasters' demonstrators was an
independent contractor should prompt a similar determination in the present
case. However, the Board of Review must apply the provisions of the Utah
Empl qyment Security Act according to the facts in the record before i t .
Where the Employment Security Act and federal standards are the same, 1t is
probable that the same result will be reached. Occasionally, differences in
fact-finding will result in contrary decisions. In this case, the Board has
had the benefit of exhaustive fact finding and active participation from the
Department and Tasters. The Board of Review is unwilling to ignore such a
complete record in order to adopt an informal opinion of the IRS which appears
to violate the IRS' own precedents.
This decision becomes final on the date i t is mailed, and ar\y
further appeal must be made within 30 days from the date of mailing. Your
appeal must be submitted in writing to the Utah Court of Appeals, Midtown
Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. To f i l e
an appeal with the Court of Appeals, you must submit to the Clerk of the
Court a Petition for Writ of Review setting forth the reasons for appeal,
pursuant to §63-46b-16 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and
Rule 14 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, followed by a Docketing
Statement and a Legal Brief as required by Rules 9 and 24-27, Rules of the
Utah Court of Appeals.

Dated this 10th day of July, 1990.
Date Mailed:

July 20, 1990
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I caused a true
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foregoing DECISION to be served upon each of the following on this £& —
day of July,

1990,

by mailing the same,

postage prepaid,

United States

mail to:
Tasters L t d . , Inc.
Attn: Sandi Cohn
1381 East 2100 South, Suite B
Salt Lake City, Utah
Gary E. Ooctorman
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Tasters L t d . , Inc.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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Tasters Ltd., Inc.,

AMENDED OPINION1
(For Publication)

Petitioner,
Case No. 900451-CA

v.
Department of Employment
Security,

F I L E D
(October 17, 1991)

Respondent.

Original Proceeding in this Court
Attorneys:

Gary E. Doctorman and Richard M. Marsh, Salt
Lake City, for Petitioner
K. Allan Zabel and Emma R. Thomas, Salt Lake
City, for Respondent

Before Judges Garff, Greenwood, and Jackson.
JACKSON, Judge:
Petitioner, Tasters Limited,
decision of the Board of Review
finding that product demonstrators
the Utah Employment Security Act.

Inc., seek review of a final
of the Industrial Commission
are employees for purposes of
We reverse and remand.

1. This opinion replaces the opinion of the same name issued June
19, 1991.
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FACTS

Tasters is in the business of providing workers to demonstrate
various products in grocery and department stores.
Tasters
maintains a list of approximately 2000 individuals who are
demonstrators. Demonstrators are contacted by Tasters regarding
the availability of demonstrations. Demonstrators may accept or
reject any given demonstration.
Once a demonstrator accepts a
particular assignment, he or she is responsible for that
demonstration and must complete the assignment or obtain a
replacement. Tasters provides no formalized training but provides
each demonstrator with a two-page instruction sheet outlining how
the demonstrations are to be carried out. The instructions address
how the demonstration should be conducted, what breaks the
demonstrator may take, how the product should be displayed, and
what attire should be worn. While orientation and other training
sessions are occasionally held, attendance is not required.
Demonstrators are paid by the job, and provide their own
equipment. On several occasions, however, Tasters has provided
demonstrators with microwave ovens. Demonstrators are reimbursed
for incidental expenses such as toothpicks or paper products used
in conjunction with a demonstration. Demonstrators must fill out
a one-page report upon completion of a demonstration, indicating
what product was demonstrated, how much of the product was sold
during the demonstration, and any expenses incurred. In addition,
demonstrators may include the responses of customers, and add their
own comments on the report form.
Store managers may provide
feedback to Tasters on the report form.
In 1989, Tasters sought a ruling from the Utah Department of
Employment Security to determine whether demonstrators were to be
considered employees or independent contractors of Tasters, based
on recent changes in Utah Code Ann. S 35-4-22(j)(5) (Supp. 1989).2
The Department found that under the Utah Employment Security Act
(the Act), demonstrators were employees of Tasters, and not
independent contractors.
Tasters appealed to an Industrial
Commission Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who affirmed the
Department's ruling. Tasters then appealed to the Board of Review,
which affirmed the ALJ's decision. This petition followed.
In its decision, the Board categorized the twenty factors set
forth in section 35-4-22(j)(5) into four general categories. The
2. The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, rearranged and
redesignated the definitions previously found in section 35-422(j)(5). See Amendment Notes, Utah Code Ann. S 35-4-22 (Supp.
1991). The definitions relevant to this case are now found in Utah
Code Ann. S 35-4-22.3(3) (Supp. 1991). In this opinion we refer to
the subsections in effect at the time the facts in the case arose,
which appear in Utah Code Ann. S 35-4-22(j)(5) (Supp. 1989).
2
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Board then identified which of the factors were relevant to the
present case, and determined whether the evidence with respect to
those factors established "the freedom and control necessary to
support a finding of independent contractor status."
Tasters argues four issues before this court: (1) that the
Board improperly interpreted the statute by categorizing the twenty
factors into four broad groupings, and by giving more weight to
some factors and less weight to others; (2) that the Board failed
to analyze all of the factors set forth in the statute; (3) that
the Board failed to make certain findings of fact when the
uncontroverted evidence supports those findings; and (4) that the
Board incorrectly determined demonstrators to be employees and not
independent contractors. In addition, Tasters urges this court to
review the record and make our own findings of fact based on
Tasters's version of the evidence.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Board's application of section 35-4-22(j) (5) to its
factual findings involves a mixed question of law and fact.
McGuire v. Department of Employment Sec., 768 P.2d 985, 987 (Utah
In reviewing an agency's
App. 1989) (citations omitted).
determination of mixed questions of fact and law, we have stated
that flwe will not disturb the Board's application of its factual
findings to the law unless its determination exceeds the bounds of
reasonableness and rationality." Pro-Benefit Staffing v. Board of
Review, 775 P.2d 439, 442 (Utah App. 1989). Although the Utah
Supreme Court has also followed this approach in numerous cases,3
that court recently conducted an in-depth analysis of the standard
of review required under Utah Code Ann. S 63-46b-16(4) (1989) of
the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), and concluded that
the Pro-Benefit Staffing approach was inconsistent with the
analysis that should be applied. Morton Int'l v. Auditing Div. of
the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 163 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 36 (Utah 1991).
In Morton Int'l. the Utah Supreme Court stated that
it is not the characterization of an issue as
a mixed question of fact and law or the
characterization of the issue as a question of
general law that is dispositive of the
determination of the appropriate level of
judicial review. Rather, what has developed
3. See, e.g., Hurley v. Board of Review, 767 P.2d 524, 527 (Utah
1988); Bennett v. Industrial Comm'n, 726 P.2d 427, 429 (Utah 1986);
Big K Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 689 P.2d 1349, 1353 (Utah
1984) .
3
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as the dispositive factor is whether the
agency, by virtue of its experience or
expertise, is in a better position than the
courts to give effect to the regulatory
objective to be achieved.
Id. (citations omitted). The court concluded that "absent a grant
of discretion, a correction-of-error standard is used in reviewing
an agency's interpretation or application of a statutory term.11
Id. at 36-37. S££fllgQMor-Flo Ind. v. Board of Review, 166 Utah
The Morton court however,
Adv. Rep. 17, 18 (Utah App. 1991).
qualified this conclusion by indicating that this analysis will not
significantly affect review of agencies' interpretations and
applications of their own statutes because "where we would
summarily grant an agency deference on the basis of its expertise,
it is also appropriate to grant the agency deference on the basis
of an explicit or implicit grant of discretion contained in the
governing statute."
Morton Int#lf 163 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37
(emphasis added)• Therefore, to determine the appropriate standard
of review in this case, we must decide if section 35-4-22(j)(5)
grants discretion to the Board to give effect to the statute.
In utilizing statutory language such as "as determined by the
commission," the legislature has explicitly granted discretion to
some agencies. See id. & n.40. Grants of discretion may also be
implied from statutory language such as "equity and good
conscience." I£. & n.41. Similarly, in the statute at issue here,
the legislature's use of the language "unless it is shown to the
satisfaction of the commission,H Utah Code Ann. S 35-4«22(j) (5)
(Supp. 1989), "if the [commission determines that the] weight of
the evidence supports that finding," id., and "considered [by the
commission] if applicable," id*, indicates an explicit grant of
discretion to the Board.4
4.

Section 35-4-22(j)(5) provides:
(5) Services performed by an individual for wages
or under any contract of hire, written or oral, express
or implied, are considered to be employment subject to
this chapter, unless it is shown to the satisfaction of
the commission that the individual is an independent
contractor. The commission shall analyze all of the
facts in Subsections (A) through (T) under the common-law
rules applicable to the employer-employee relationship to
determine if an individual is an independent contractor.
An individual is an independent contractor if the weight
of the evidence supports that finding. The following
factors are to be considered if applicable:
(A) whether the individual works his or
her own schedule or is required to comply with
another person's instructions about when,
(continued.••)
4
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4.

(...continued)
where, and how work is to be performed;
(B) whether the individual uses his or
her own methods and requires no specific
training from the purchaser, or is trained by
an experienced employee working with him or
her, is required to take correspondence or
other courses, attend meetings, and by other
methods indicates that the employer wants the
services performed;
(C) whether the individual's services are
independent of the success or continuation of
a business or are merged into the business
where success and continuation of the business
depends upon those services and the employer
coordinates work with the work of others;
(D) whether the individual's services may
be assigned to others or must be rendered
personally;
(E) whether the individual has the right
to hire, supervise, and pay other assistants
pursuant to a contract under which the
individual
is responsible
only for the
attainment of a result or the individual
hires, supervises, and pays workers at the
direction of the employer;
(F) whether the individual was hired to
do one job and has no continuous business
relationship with the person for whom the
services are performed or continues to work
for the same person year after year;
(G) whether the individual establishes
his or her own time schedule or does the
employer set the time schedule;
(H) whether the individual is free to
work when and for whom he or she chooses, or
is required to devote full-time to the
business of the employer, and is restricted
from doing other gainful work;
(I) whether the individual uses his or
her own office, desk, telephone, or other
equipment
or
is
physically
within
the
employer's direction and supervision;
(J) whether the individual is free to
perform services at his or her own pace or
performs services in the order or sequence set
by the employer;
(K) whether the individual submits no
reports or is required to submit regular oral
(continued...)
5
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The Board is given latitude under the statutory language to
weigh and analyze the applicability of each of the twenty factors
to individual facts.
The language in the statute bespeaks a
legislative intent to delegate interpretation of that statute to
the agency. Morton Int'l, 163 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37. Given that
the legislature granted discretion to the agency in interpreting
section 35-4-22(j) (5), it is in a better position than the court to

4.

(...continued)
or written reports to the employer;
(L) whether the individual is paid by the
job or on a straight commission or is paid by
the employer in regular amounts at stated
intervals;
(M) whether the individual accounts for
his or her own expenses or is paid by the
employer for expenses;
(N) whether the individual furnishes his
or her own jtools or is furnished tools and
materials by the employer;
(0) whether the individual has a real#
essential, and adequate investment in the
business or has a lack of investment and
depends on the employer for such facilities;
(P) whether the individual may realize a
profit or suffer a loss as a result of
services performed or cannot realize a profit
or loss by making good or poor decisions;
(Q) whether the individual works for a
number of persons or firms at the same time or
usually works for only one employer;
(R) whether the individual has his or her
own office and assistants, holds a business
license, is listed in business directories,
maintains a business telephone, or advertises
in newspapers or does not make services
available except through a business in which
he or she has no interest;
(S) whether the individual may not be
fired or discharged as long as he or she
produces a result which meets contract
specifications or may be discharged at any
time; and
(T) whether the individual agrees to
complete
a
specific
service,
and
is
responsible for its satisfaction or is legally
obligated to perform the service, or may
terminate his or her relationship with the
employer at any time.
6
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give effect to the legislative intent, and therefore, we will not
disturb the Board's decision unless it is unreasonable.5
As to Tasters' challenge to the Board's factual findings,
agency decisions regarding basic facts have historically been
considered conclusive if they were supported by the evidence. Seg
McGuire, 768 P.2d at 987 (citation omitted). This test allowed
appellate courts to review only that part of the record which
supported the Board's findings. See Grace Drilling v. Board of
Review. 776 P.2d 63, 68 n.7 (Utah App. 1989). Proceedings which
were commenced after January 1, 1988, are governed by Utah Code
Ann. S 63-46b-16(4) (1989) of UAPA, and f,[w)e now review both sides
of the record to determine whether the Board's findings are
supported by substantial evidence." I£. MIn undertaking such a
review, this court will not substitute its judgment as between two
reasonably conflicting views, even though we may have come to a
different conclusion had the case come before us for de novo
review.11 !£. at 68 (citations omitted).
ANALYSIS
A.

Application of the Statute

Tasters first argues that the Board improperly interpreted the
statute by utilizing an arbitrary categorization, and by giving
more weight to some factors and less weight to others.
The statutory test at issue in this case is set forth in Utah
Code Ann. S 35-4-22(j) (5) (Supp. 1989). Prior to April 24, 1989,
the statute utilized a two-part ("A-B") test to determine whether
an individual was an independent contractor or an employee for
purposes of the Act.
That test required that the individual
performing the services be "free from control or direction over the
performance of those services" and be "customarily engaged in an
independently established trade, occupation, profession, or
business of the same nature as that involved in the contract of
service." Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-22(j)(5) (1988).

5. See algfi Salt Lake Citv Corp. v. Confer. 674 P.2d 632, 636
(Utah 1983) (Where wording of legislation does not give any basis
for preferring one interpretation over another, "we deem it
preferable to defer to the interpretation adopted by the
administrative body to which the Legislature committed the
administration of this Act."). In Morton Int'lr the supreme court
cited Salt Lafre City CQfP* with approval, stating that "[t]he
approach used in Salt Lake Citv Corp. is consistent with [UAPA]."
Morton Int'l, 163 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37.
7
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The A-B test was replaced in April 1989 with a test that
relied upon twenty factors which the Internal Revenue Service had
identified as significant in determining independent contractor
status.6 In reviewing the evidence, the Board grouped the twenty
factors into four categories: factors A# B, G, J, and K were found
to relate to the amount of control Tasters exercised over
demonstrators in the performance of their duties (hereinafter
Category One); factors C, F# H, 0, P, Q, and R were found to relate
to the degree of independence and separation existing between
demonstrators and Tasters (Category Two); factors D, E, L, S, and
T were found to relate to the relationship between Tasters and the
demonstrators (Category Three); and factors I, M, and N were found
to relate to the investment and allocation of expenses between the
parties (Category Four). Tasters challenges this categorization,
arguing that because the statute does not expressly provide for
such categorization, the Board had no authority to do so.
M

0n only one point as to the relative weight of the various
tests is there an accepted rule of law: It is constantly said that
the right to control the details of the work is the primary test."
1C A. Larson# The Law of Workmen's Compensationf S 43.30 at 8-10
(1990)[hereinafter Larson). The Restatement (Second) of Agency
S 220 (1958) spells out a typical definition and summary of such
tests, listing ten factors to be considered as part of the
analysis. These ten factors, focusing on "right to control" and
"nature of work#" are reflected in the twenty factors listed in the
statute at issue here.
Emphasizing "right to control" has historically been an
integral element of Subsection (j) (5). In 1920, our supreme court,
for the first time, defined an independent contractor as one who is

6.
The current version of Subsection (j) (5) of the statute at
issue maintains the prior statute's presumption in favor of finding
employment status: "Services performed by an individual for wages
or under any contract of hire, written or oral, express or implied,
are considered to be employment subject to this chapter unless it
is shown to the satisfaction of the commission that the individual
is an independent contractor." Utah Code Ann. $ 35-4-22(j) (5)
(Supp. 1989). The presumption may be rebutted if "it is shown to
the satisfaction of the commission that the individual is an
independent contractor." J&. See
also
Superior
Cablevislon
Installers v. Industrial Comm'n, 688 P.2d 444, 447 (Utah 1984) (The
Act "should be liberally construed in favor of affording
benefits."); Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n. 104 Utah
175, 134 P.2d 479, 485 (1943) (Subdivision (j)(5) is an exception
or exclusion section excluding certain persons from receiving
benefits.).

8
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under contract to render service or do work for another according
to his own method, means, and manner of doing the work and without
being subject to the control, direction, or supervision of such
other, except as to the result of the work or service. Strieker v.
Industrial Comm'n, 55 Utah 603, 188 P. 849, 850-51 (1920) (for
purposes of the Workers's Compensation Act), In 1936, the Utah
Legislature passed the Unemployment Compensation Act which read in
pertinent part:
Services performed by an individual for
wages shall be deemed to be employment subject
to this act unless and until it is shown to
the satisfaction of the commission that —
(a) such individual has been and
will continue to be free from
control or direction over the
performance of such services, both
under his contract of service and in
fact; and
(b) such service is either outside
the usual course of the business for
which such service is performed or
that such service is performed
outside of all the places of
business of the enterprise for which
service is performed; and
(c) such individual is customarily
engaged
in
an
independently
established
trade,
occupation,
profession or business.
Unemployment Compensation Act, S 19(J) (5) (Chapter 1, Laws of Utah
1936, Special Session, as amended by Chapter 43, Laws of Utah 1937)
(quoted in Creameries of America v. Industrial Comm'nf 98 Utah 571,
102 P.2d 300, 301-02 (1940)).
In 1986, Subsection (j)(5)(B) was deleted and former
Subsection (j)(5)(C) was redesignated as Subsection (j)(5)(B), and
in 1989, Subsections (A) and (B) were rewritten, and Subsections
(C) through (T) were added as described supr^. In amending the
statute in 1989, the legislature did not change the test's emphasis

9
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on "control and direction," or on "independent establishment in
business."7
The four categories designated by the Board—amount of
control, degree of independence and separation, the status of the
relationship, and amount of investment—reflect the test the
legislature has traditionally dictated in determining whether an
individual is an independent contractor or an employee. The focus
on control and independence is the same focus which other
jurisdictions apply in examining this issue. See Larson at § 43,
and cases cited therein. The inclusion of a category which has as
its focus "status of the relationship" indicates that the commonlaw definition of employee is also meant to be examined, although
not controlling.
See generally id.
"Amount of investmentH
dictates a more narrow examination into factors such as equipment
requirements and who supplies them, but still addresses the more
general question of control and independence.
"While the Commission's interpretation of this word is not the
only reasonable interpretation that could have been adopted, it is
well within the limits of reasonableness that confine judicial
review of administrative decisions of this nature." Salt Lake City
Corp. y. Confer, 674 P.2d 632, 636 (Utah 1983) (citing Utah Deo't
of Admin. Serv. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601# 609-12 (Utah
1983)). See also Morton Int'l v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 163 Utah
Adv. Rep. 34, 36-37 (Utah 1991). We conclude that the Board's
interpretation of Utah Code Ann. S 35-4-22 (j) (5) # grouping the
factors into four categories, was not unreasonable.
B.

Failure to Make Requisite Findings

Tasters next arguep that the Board summarily disregarded many
of the twenty factors enumerated in Subsection (j)(5), and failed
to consider the facts underlying those factors. Tasters contends
that the language "shall analyze all of the facts" requires the
Board to study each and every fact underlying each of the twenty
factors, and then determine if the factor relevant to those facts
is to be considered.1
1.
In amending the statute, the Utah Legislature expressed no
desire to change the emphasis or focus of the old test, but merely
attempted to clarify its application: "(the old version of the
statute) created somewhat of a hardship especially on small
businesses in that there were those outside the business area that
didn't understand the difference between an independent contractor
and a [sic] employee." Senate Proceeding on Senate Bill No. 164.
8. To determine if an individual is an independent contractor,
(t]he commission shall analyze all of the
facts in Subsections (A) through (T) under the
(continued...)
10
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The Board stated at the outset of its decision that section
35-4-22(j) (5) "recognizes that not each of its 20 factors (A
through T) will apply in every situation."
The Board then
determined that most of the factors in Category Two, except "R,"
and all of the factors in Category Four were not significant in the
present case. For some of the factors that were considered by the
Board to be relevant, such as the factors comprising Category One,
evidence relating to the factors was outlined. For other relevant
factors, e.g., Category Three, the Board simply stated that those
factors were significant to the case. For Category Four, the Board
simply stated that ,f[t]hese factors are not useful under the
circumstances of this case since equipment reimbursements are
minimal and expenses are reimbursed by Tasters'[s] clients.M No
findings were made as to why some of the factors were
insignificant, while others were considered significant.
This
analysis was in error.
We agree with Tasters that the Board cannot dismiss as
inapplicable one or more of the factors listed in the statute
absent some discussion as to their inapplicability. Subsidiary
findings must be made in sufficient detail on all necessary issues
so that we may determine if "there is a logical and legal basis for
the ultimate conclusions.11 Milne Truck Lines v. Public Service
"The importance of
CommLn, 720 P.2d 1373, 1378 (Utah 1986).
complete, accurate, and consistent findings of fact is essential to
a proper determination by an administrative agency." !£. Without
such findings, we cannot review the Board's ultimate conclusion
that Tasters's demonstrators were employees. Therefore, it is
necessary to remand to make additional findings of fact that
resolve the issues which are relevant to its decision.
C.

Challenge to Factual Findings

The Board also concluded that Tasters's demonstrators were
employees, and not independent contractors under the Act, after
reviewing the record, and making its own findings of fact. Tasters
challenges this determination.
Because we reverse the Board's
determination and remand for entry of appropriate findings of fact,
we do not reach this issue.

(...continued)
common-law rules applicable to the employeremployee relationship to determine if an
individual is an independent contractor. An
individual is an independent contractor if the
weight of the evidence supports that finding.
The following factors are to be considered if
applicable . . . .
Utah Code Ann. S 35-4-22(j)(5) (Supp. 1989).
8.
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CONCLUSION
The case is remanded to the Department of Employment Security
to make additional findings of fact which are relevant to the
determination of employee or independent contractor status.

Norman H. Jacks on, *"Judge

WE CONCUR:
f

^Z&ts<£/'

w

Regnal W. Garff, Judge

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
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BOARD OF REVIEW
The I n d u s t r i a l Commission of Utah
Unenployment Compensation Appeals

SMJVKAIVERT/odra

TASTERS LIMITED, INC.
BTployer No, 1-117373-0
Case No. 89-A-4044-Z
DECISION
Case No. 92-ER-262-T
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
The Board o f Review p r e v i o u s l y h e l d t h a t food demonstrators working

for the enployer, Tasters, could not be c l a s s i f i e d as independent contractors
under Section 35-4-22(j) (5) of the Utah Employment Security Act.
Tasters
appealed the Board f s decision t o the Utah Court of Appeals. The Utah Court of
Appeals remanded the matter t o the Board t o make additional findings of fact
with regard t o each of the factors articulated as appropriate for consideration
by the Board under Section 35-4-22(j) (5) in making a determination of
independent contractor status.
Based upon i t s review of the record, the Board of Review makes the
following findings of fact: Tasters i s in the business of providing workers t o
brokers and manufacturers' representatives for the purpose of demonstrating
various products at grocery and departanent s t o r e s . Each demonstrator works on
an o n - c a l l , part-time basis with no guarantee of any particular schedule or
number of work hours. Each demonstrator i s free t o accept or decline offered
assignments as he or she sees f i t .
Tasters gives each demonstrator a two-page s e t of written instructions
governing the perfonnance of t h e i r duties, including details such as a t t i r e ,
length of breaks, product display, and demonstration tactics. Demonstrators are
prohibited from having children present, smoking, reading or s i t t i n g while on
the job.
Orientation and other training sessions are sometimes held for
demonstrators, but attendance i s not required. Payment for attendance a t such
meetings i s made by Tasters 1 c l i e n t brokers or manufacturers.
Once a demonstrator accepts a particular assignment, he or she must
report for work according t o a s e t schedule. The demonstrator*s performance in
the store may be monitored by Tasters 1 f i e l d representative or by Tasters 1
c l i e n t s . While individualized supervision i s not generally provided, the field
representative and c l i e n t s give instruction when necessary. At the end of each
demonstration, demonstrators are required t o submit a report to Tasters. The
report indicates what product was demonstrated, hew much of the product was sold
during the demonstration, and any expenses incurred for the demonstration. Ihe
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worker may report the respoi-ises of customers and any comments the demonstrator
may have. Store managers may a l s o provide comments on the report form.
The demonstrators are either provided the supplies used in
domonstration or reimbursed for their expense of such supplies.
The
demonstrators provide equipment, such as frying pans and card tables, at their
cwn expense.
Tasters sometimes provides microwave ovens, then charges i t s
c l i e n t s rental fees for t h e i r use.
Demonstrators are paid for a l l demonstrations by Tasters on a per job
b a s i s . Occasionally, demonstrators delegate assignments to other demonstrators,
who then are paid for the work. Tasters carries Workers Compensation Insurance
on the demonstrators but provides no other fringe benefits and does; not withhold
payroll taxes from demonstrators 1 pay checks.
The demonstrators and Tasters are free to terminate their relationship
with each other at any time.
Demonstrators perform their s^irvices under
Tasters' business name. Although they are free to perform services for other
employers, none advertise, maintain offices or obtain business licenses. Many
have other full-time or part-time jobs.
Some are hcmemakers and some are
students.
In judging whether the foregoing facts substantiate Tasters 1 position
t h a t i t s demonstrators are irrieperctent contractors, the Board of Review i s
guided by Section 35-4-22.3(3) [fomerly 35-4-22(j) (5)] of the Utah Biployment
Security Act, which provides in material part as follows:
Services performed by an individual for wages or under any
contract of h i r e , written or oral, express or ijiplied, are
considered t o be employment subject t o this chapter, unless
i t i s shewn t o the s a t i s f a c t i o n of the expromission that the
individual i s an independent contractor.
The ooranission
shall analyze a l l of the facts in subsections (a) through
(t) under the common-law rules applicable t o the employer*emplqyee relationship t o deteodne i f an individual i s an
independent contractor.
An individual i s an independent
contractor i f the weight of the evidence supports that
finding.
The following fcictors are t o be considered i f
applicable: [Factors (a) through (t) follow, but have been
omitted due t o t h e i r length.]
The Board has carefully examined each of the factors enunciated by
Section 35-4-22.3(3) in l i g h t of t h i s particular factual situation. The Board
determines that the following factors are significant in shewing that Tasters 1
demonstrators are employees rather than independent contractors:

nnn«**:ft
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Factor (a) requires the Boani to determine "whether the individual
works his own schedule or is required to conply with another person's
instructions about when, where, and hew work is to be performed".
Although individual demonstrators can decide not to accept
certain assignments, they are not free to decide when,
where, and hew their work is performed.
They receive
specific instructions on hew and when the demonstrations are
to be performed. Since the demonstrators are required to
conform to another personfs instructions about vfoen, where,
and hew the work is to be performed, analysis of this factor
strongly
indicates
employee
status
for Tasters
demonstrators.
Factor (b) requires the Board to decide "whether the individual uses
his or her cwn methods and requires no specific training from the purchaser, or
is trained by an experienced employee working with him or her, is required to
take correspondence or other courses, attend meetings, and by other methods
indicates that the employer wants the services performed".
While Tasters does not make mandatory the classroom or
seminar training it provides, it does provide written
instruction about hew the work is to be done. The facts as
examined under this factor shew employee status for Tasters
demonstrators.
Factor (c) asks "whether the individuals services are independent of
the success or continuation of a business or are merged into the business where
success and continuation of the business depends upon those services and the
employer coordinates work with the work of others".
The sole purpose of Tasters1 business is to conduct
demonstrations for brokers. The individual demonstrators1
services are not
independent of the success and
continuation of the business.
Therefore, since the
demonstrator service is merged into Tasters1 business, this
factor very strongly indicates that the demonstrators are
employees.
Factor (g) asks "whether the individual establishes his own time
schedule or the enplqyer sets the time schedule".
Testimony from demonstrators shews that while demonstrators
have the opportunity to reject offers of work from Tasters
they must go to work at the time cc»TTmunicated to them by
Tasters if they decide to work.
Even though Tasters does
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not set the time frames for each demonstration, Tasters
alleys the brokers and store managers to make this decision
for the demonstrators. Since the individual demonstrators
do not set their am hours# analysis of the facts of this
case under factor (g) strongly indicates employee status for
the demonstrators.
Factor (k) asks lfwhether the individual submits no reports or is
required to submit regular oral or written reports to the employer".
The fact that demonstrators are required to submit detailed
reports to Testers at the end of each demonstration strongly
indicates employee status as opposed to independent
contractor status.
Factor (m) requires the Board to consider if applicable 'Whether the
individual accounts for his own expanses or is paid by the employer for
expenses".
Demonstrators are either provided incidental supplies, such
as toothpicks, napkins, caps,
by the store or broker or
submit costs to Tasters, for reiiiixirsement. Significant to
the Board is the fact that Tasters has the right to apprcve
or disapprove questionable costs to be paid to the
denraistrators when the costs are submitted to than for
reiihbursement.
Analysis of the facts under this factor
strongly indicates employee status.
Factor (p) asks f,whether the individual may realize a profit or
suffer a loss as a result of services performed or cannot realize a profit or
loss by making good or poor decisions".
Analysis of the facts under this factor strongly indicates
employee status as no matter hew the demonstrator runs his
or her demonstration, it has no effect on his or her
eventual pay for the demonstration.
The individual's
performance does not alter his or her profit or loss frexn
the venture.
Factor (r) asks "vhether the individual has his cwn office and
assistants, holds a business license, is listed in business directories,
maintains a business telephone, or advertises in newspapers or does not make
services available except through a business in vhich he or she has no
interest".
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Some Tasters employees work for other demonstrator
companies, but working part-time for several employers in
the same line of business does not mean that the individual
who performs that part-time enployment has h i s or her cwn
business. There i s nothing in the look or nature of the
kind of work that Tasters demonstrators do, nor in the way
they organize t h e i r work, t o indicate they run their cwn
businesses.
The demonstrators do not have their cwn
offices, they do not have business licenses, they do not
advertise, maintain business phones or l i s t i n g s in business
directories.
Demonstrators work for others \iho have
businesses. Analysis under t h i s factor strongly indicates
enployee status.
Factor (o) requires the Board of Review t o determine lfwhether the
individual has a real, essential, and adequate investment in the business or
has a lack of investment and depends on the enployer for such facilities' 1 .
Testers argues that t h e i r demonstrators have a business
investment in being a demonstrator in that they irust buy a
card table, frying pan and other u t e n s i l s . The Board notes
that these items can be purchased a t minimal cost, which
does not constitute a significant investment. These items
are not specialized equipment unique t o t h i s business but
are conmonly cwned by most people. As a consequence, these
items cannot be viewed as a business investment. The Board
determines that the facts weighed against t h i s factor tend
to indicate enployee status.
The following factors are applicable in the matter at hand and tend to
indicate independent contractor status for Tasters demonstrators:
Factor (1) asks lfwhether the individual i s paid by the job or on a
straight oonrussion or i s paid by the enployer in regular amounts a t stated
intervals".
Tasters demonstrators are paid by the job for each
demonstration oonpleted and not by a regular pay check that
comes a t a regular interval.
Factor (q) asks "whether the individual works for a number of persons
or firms at the same time or usually works for only one employer11.
While not a l l of the individuals work for others, many of
them do.
Viewed alone, analysis of t h i s factor would
i n d i c a t e independent c o n t r a c t o r s t a t u s for the
demonstrators but since the demonstrators tend t o work as
enployees for other companies or individuals in different
types of businesses.
Analysis of t h i s factor shews
independent contractor status only very weakly.
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Factor (d) asks "whether the individuals services may he assigned to
others or must be rendered personally 11 .
Evidence in the record suggests that the denonstrators in a
few instances have assigned their duties to others. The
fact that this possibility i s available to demonstrators
does tend to indicate independent contractor status. The
Board gives this factor minimal significance # hcwever, since
individual demonstrators assign their duties to others only
rarely. Furthermore, substitutes are not under the control
of the demonstrator, but are under control of Tasters to the
same extent and degree as the demonstrator would have been
had she performed the work.
Factor (h) asks "whether the individual i s free to work when and for
whan he chooses, or i s required t o devote full-time to
the business of the
enployer, and i s restricted frcm doing other gainful work11.
This question has1 minimal applicability in that the very
nature of Tasters business means that no one could bet a
full-time demonstrator for Tasters since demonstrations eire
only set up during peak traffic hours in stores.
Still,
since many Tasters employees have other work, analysis of
the facts under t h i s factor would tend t o indicate
independent contractor status,,
Factor (n) requires the Board to examine "whether the individual
furnishes his cwn tools or i s furnished tools and materials by the employer".
This factor is one of minor significance, since vrtiile the
demonstrators furnish their cwn "tools," these "tools" are
not the kind associated with an independent business
venture.
Ihe denonstrators purchase, have and use "the
tools of their trade" mostly for personal use in their own
homes. Therefore, while factor (n) applies to the matter at
hand, i t i s of marginal significance in i t s indication of
independent contractor status for the denoistrators.
Finally, some of the factors enumerated under Section 35-4-22.3(3) are
not helpful in determining whether the demonstrators are independent contractors
or employees:
Factor (e) requires the Board to examine ,fwhether the individual has
the right to hire, supervise, and pay other assistants pursuant t o a contract
under which the individual i s responsible only for the attainment of a result or
the individual hires, supervises, and pays workers at the direction of the
enployer".
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The record does not show that when a demonstrator does get a
replacement there is any kind of a contract governing the
replacement's work. Clearly that kind of a transfer of a
deiTonstrator's job is not at all what is anticipated by
factor (e) anyway because of the short term and untechnical
nature of the work done by Tasters demonstrators.
Therefore, this factor is inapplicable.
Factor (f) asks "whether the individual was hired to do one job and
has no continuous business relationship with the person for whom the services
are performed or continues to work for the same person year after year".
This factor again adds nothing to the determination of
independent contractor status in that both halves of the
factor appear to be true. There is no way to give greater
weight to either the employee portion of the factor or the
independent contractor portion of the factor.
While
demonstrators are hired for each individual job, a
continuous business relationship can also be maintained if
Tasters keeps calling and the demonstrator keeps accepting
demonstrations. An analysis of this factor gives no useful
information in determining whether or not a demonstrator is
an independent contractor or an enployee.
Factor (i) requires the Board to determine "whether the individual
uses his or her cwn office, desk, telephone, or other equipment or is
physically within the employer's direction and supervision".
Tasters demonstrators do their work at stores cwned by
others.
Since neither the individual demonstrators nor
Tasters cwns, operates or manages the sites where work is
performed, this factor is inapplicable and of no use in
determining whether the demonstrators are employees or
independent contractors.
Factor (j) requires the Board to determine "wliether the individual is
free to perform services at his or her w n pace or performs service in the order
or sequence set by the employer".
Demonstrators work consists of handing out samples to those
who pass by for a set period of time. There is no "pacing"
involved in this kind of work and no ordered sequence of
duties because of the nature of the work. This factor is
therefore inapplicable to the present fact situation.
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Factor (s) asks "whether the individual may not fce fired or
discharged as long as he produces a result which meets contract specifications
or may be discharged a t any time".
There i s no evidence in the record that Tasters has
discharged a demonstrator in the middle of a shift, but
Tasters does drop people from t h e i r computer l i s t i f they do
not accept jobs often enough or i f they perform poorly.
Since the termination of the work arrangement between
Tasters and i t s demonstrators i s different than both of the
scenarios anticipated by factor ( s ) , factor (s) i s not
helpful in reaching a determination of whether the
demonstrators are independent contractors or enplcyees.
Factor (t) requires the Board t o determine "whether the individual
agrees t o corplete a specific s e r v i c e , and i s responsible for i t s satisfaction
or i s l e g a l l y obligated t o perform the service, or may terminate h i s or her
relationship with the employer a t any time".
This factor i s inapplicable for the same reasons discussed
above in the analysis of factor ( s ) .
Termination of the
employment agreement between Testers and i t s demonstrators
occurs merely by that person's name being dropped off the
computer l i s t so that the individual i s not called t o work,
or by the individual declining assignments.
In summary, a careful analysis of each factor articulated under
Section 35-4-22.3(3) of the Utah Enployment Security Act reveals that the
preponderance of the evidence weighs heavily against a ruling that Tasters
demonstrators are independent contractors.
The demonstrators are under the
direction and control of Tasters, as evidenced by Tasters' detailed written
instructions t o the demonstrators, Tasters' requirement that dcanonstrators
submit written reports of each demonstration completed, Tasters' review of the
demonstrators' use of incidental supplies before approval of repayment can be
made, and the fact that demonstrators cannot s e t their own time frames for work
but must work the schedule set by the store as cxxrimunicated to them l?y Tasters.
Furthermore, the demonstrators are not in business for themselves but
are an integral part of Tasters' business, as evidenced by the fact that none of
the demonstrators have a financial investment in the business, none can realize
p r o f i t or l o s s from the manner in which they do their work, and none hold
business l i c e n s e s , maintain business phones or cards or advertise, line Board of
Review therefore affirms the decision of the Administrative Law Judge that
Tasters demonstrators are not independent contractors within the meaning of
Section 35-4-22.3(3) of the Utah Employment Security Act, but are employees
within the meaning of the Utah Enployment Security Act.
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This decision becomes final on the date it is nailed, and any further
appeal must be made within 30 days from the date of nailing. Your appeal mist
be submitted in writing to the Utah Court of Appeals, Midtcwn Plaza, 230 South
500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. To file an appeal with the
Court of Appeals, you must submit to the Clerk of the Court a Petition for Writ
of Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, pursuant to Section 63-46b-16 of
the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, followed by a Docketing Statement and a Legal Brief as
required by Rules 9 and 247, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure*

Dated this 27th day of July, 1992.
Date Mailed:

September 9, 1992,
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Nelson:

Yes. Yes. If I—if I was busy that weekend, I didnft have to, ah, do
it; and she would ca—there f s her name, Patsy Buckmiller.

Judge:

Okay.

Nelson:

Yes.

Judge:

Was there any problems when you declined the work?

Nelson:

No. No, there wasn't.

Judge:

Did you work any particular hours?

Nelson:

Ah, ah, yeah, there was. There was either from, let me think. It was
either from 10 to 5 or 11 to 6 and then sometimes there would only
have an—an afternoon one, which would usually run about 12 to, ah, 6.

Judge:

Hew were these hours determined?

Nelson:

Ah, let me see. I think it was supposed to be an eight-hour work day
on, ah, the main day, not the short day, the new one. And, ah, then
we would get, ah, usually an hour off for lunch.

Judge:

Do you know who determined these hours?

Nelson:

I assume, ah, it was the grocery store.

Judge:

Why do you assume it was the grocery store?

Nelson:

Well, 'cause t—they would, ah, ah, from what I understood, they would
call Tasters and say they wanted a demonstration done; and I as—so I
assumed they were the ones that said what the hours were—that they
wanted the demonstration done.

Judge:

Once you had received the hours you were to be present, were you
required to be present throughout those scheduled hours?

Nelson:

Yes.

Judge:

Could you leave the premises at all during those—during those hours?

Nelson:

Ah, I did not. I do knew like if, ah, I know one lady she got seme
stuff spilled on her clothes and she had to go heme and change; but
then, when she came back, she did work, I think it was extra half an
hour to make up for when she left.

Judge:

Okay. What is the basis of your pay?

Nelson:

Ahm, the basis of my pay.

Did you ever decline any work?
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Judge:

Are you paid per jab, per hour, ocnitdssion?

Nelson:

It seems like it was per Job. I—it was, let me think. It was--oh,
look at my papers here, what they were. I think it was $30.00 per
day, if I remember right.

Judge:

And that's for an ei^it-hour day?

Nelson:

Uh-huh.

Judge:

If you worked, ah, the sh—just the afternoon denonstration, what was
the basis of your pay?

Nelson:

Ah, new that I don't remember. I remember I did one. Let me see if I
have that paper here—when I did it. I can't remember. I know it was
less than $30.00. I remember that; so apparently it must have been on
an hourly basis; 'cause I do know that on the short day it was less
than the—the eight-hour day.

Judge:

Okay.
doing?

Nelson:

Yes.

Judge:

Who would that person be?

Nelson:

That was Patsy Buckmiller and sometimes the other lady who got me
started, Debbie Henry.

Judge:

And what was the purpose of these visits?

Nelson:

Ah, the first few times was to come and make sure I was doing okay,
beca—you know, 'cause I had just started; and then the other times
was to see if there was anything that—that I needed that they could
go and get for me and to see if, ah, there was enough product to
demonstrate.

Judge:

Would anybody else check on you?

Nelson:

No.

Judge:

Was there ever occasion vtoere the store manager would check on you?

Nelson:

Ah, he oould have, 'cause I knew I saw him a lot. You knew, they—
they'd walk by, so they oould have been diecking also.

Judge:

Okay. Would you[ explain exactly what you do in your demonstrations,
hew—from the beginning to end,

Nelson:

Okay.
I would go in and set up my table and, ah, we put the—the
product out on the table in a display. We had our cooking pains there
to cook the food if it needed to be cooked; and we would start up the

Would anybody visit the demonstration to see what you were
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cooking—like, say if it was hot dogs, we'd start cooking them. We'd
have napkins and, ah, or toothpicks there for the people to take i —
you know, when they took the—the saxrple; and we had the sample set
out on a plate or sometimes there were individual paper cups that they
could take the samples and sample them. When the people would walk
by, I would ask them if they would lite a sample and sane would say
yes and sane would say no; and I would-~-when they would sample it, I
would tell them about the product, how much it was and if it was on
sale and if there was anything liJce no cholesterol or—or you knew,
important little factors that pecple would like to knew, hew to fix it
if they didnft know how to fix it.
Judge:

Okay.

And what would happen at the conclusion of your work?

Nelson:

Ah, I would fold up my table and put it away. Ah, the packages fron
the product I keep in a sack and I would count them and fill out a
paper that we had that we kept inventory of what we had used and what
was on the shelves and, ah, then the store manager would have to sign
it and—or their manager of that departaient would have to sign it and
okay everything. Ah, I would leave the empty sacks with them so that
they knew what the count was. If there was any little bit of product
left over, we was allowed to take that home.

Judge:

Okay. This report that you had indicated where you listed inventory,
was that just for inventory or was there other information on the
report?

Nelson:

Let's see. On the report was the name of the product, hew many cases
there was to begin with, ah, how many there was after it was over and
then hew many was used as sanples and then they kind of estimated hew
many units were sold because of the demonstration. Ah, let's see,
what else was on there. The name of the store is on there and, ah,
ah, what the weather was like was on there; and they also had us fill
out what the people said, conroents and th—where the store manager
signed and also their comments. That—thatfs basically what was on
the paper.

Judge:

Okay.

Nelson:

Ah, I don't knew. I assume because it was their store and they had to
okay the demonstration. I knew before we ever went in to demonstrate,
we had to call and okay it with them that it was all right that we did
this demonstration; and then I guess they, ah, it was part of their
responsibility; and so they needed to sign it and okay it.

Judge:

All right. After you have the report ocnpleted, what did you do with
the report?

Nelson:

I would mail it to Tasters at—let's see. I would—there was two
copies.
I would, ah, give one to the store, the manager of the
department and then, ah, I would take the other one, if I remember
right, and send it to Tasters.

Why did you obtain the store manger's signature?

9
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determined that your work

for them

was unsatisfactory

and they had,

ah, terminated the relationship, would you feel that they would have
had any liability as far as you were concerned?
Nelson:

I don't think so.

Levanger:

Okay.

Judge:

Counsellor, do you have sane questions?

Doctorman:

I do.
Beverly, my name is Gary Doctorman.
I'm an attorney and
represent Tasters, Inc. I—I will have a few questions for you.

Nelson:

Okay.

Doctorman:

If Tasters asked you to, say, go to Provo to do a demonstration, would
you feel free to turn them dcwn?

Nelson:

Oh, yes. They, ah, called and asked me to go to, ah, Castledale one
day; and I told them no, that I didn't want to travel that far to go
and do a demonstration.

Doctorman:

So would it be true th—then where do you generally perform your
demonstrations?

Nelson:

I generally do it here in Price.

Doctorman:

Is that your place of choice?

Nelson:

Yes.

That's all the questions I have.

Doctorman: And if Tasters asked you to perform a demonstration at a time that was
inconvenient to you and you didn't want to perform it at that time,
would you feel free to turn that dcwn?
Nelson:

Yes.

Doctorman: And would there be any repercussions for, ah, that?
Nelson:

No, there wasn't.

Doctorman:

So you effectively could select the time and place with which you
wanted to work by either accepting or rejecting, ah, available
demonstrations. Is that correct?

Nelson:

Yes.

Doctorman:

Did Tasters ever tell you specifically hew to perform the details of
your demonstration or were the details left to you to determine?

Nelson:

The details were left to me to determine.
13
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Doctorman:

You never attended any training session in Salt Lake put on by
Tasters? Is that correct?

Nelson:

That's right.

Doctorman:

Did Tasters ever tell you that you could not assign your services to
any other person?

Nelson:

No.

Doctontan:

Did Tasters ever tell you that you could not hire an assistant, if you
s—

Nelson:

No.

Doctorman:

If, ah, for instance, you had scheduled yourself for a—an all-day
session and you determined that, after you had scheduled that session,
that you could only work half that time, would you have considered
hiring or using someone else to work the other half of that shift?

Nelson:

Yes, we—we did that. Ah, if one of us had to go someplace,
ah, they
would call one of the other ladies that would also do demos, and they
would cone in and fill in for them.

Doctorman:

Did Tasters tell you when you could take lunch breaks?

Nelson:

No, they did not. I knew that we had a lunch break, but they did not
say at what time we had to take then.

Doctorman:

Did Tasters tell you at what time you could take breaks during the
day?

Nelson:

No.

Doctorman:

Did Tasters monitor your breaks or your lunch breaks?

Nelson:

Not that I know of, they didn't.

Doctorman: And, if you wanted to have left the store at any time for the day, for
your personal reasons or for an emergency, did you have to report to
Tasters?
Nelson:

No, I did not.

Doctorman:

Did Tasters have a requirement on the pace of your work? And by that
I mean hew many people that you contacted in the store, hew—hew many
products that you demonstrated or get o—or gave out or any o—any of
those factors?

Nelson:

No, they didn't.
14
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Doctorman:

And it's clear that Tasters didn't provide any equipment, and you
provided all your own equipment.

Nelson:

Yes.

Doctorman:

What, ah, do you believe your investment in that equipment to be?
In dollar figures.

Nelson:

Dollar figures.

Doctorman:

Ycu can either add it up—however you want to do it. You can do it
out loud or—wh—piece by piece or as a whole, whatever you'd like to
do.

Nelson:

Oh, let's see. I had the card table and a table cloth and frying pan,
utensils. I guess around $40.00, $40.00-$45 00.

Doctorman:

You can buy a card table and frying and utensils for $40.00 in Price?

Nelson:

(Laughing) Let me think of it. Card tables are usually $20.00, and
frying pans are usually around $20.00. Now, a table cloth would
probably run around $5.00. I guess it would be more than $40.00.

Doctorman:

Okay.

Nelson:

Probably, ah, between 45 and—probably more like $50.00.

Doctorman:

All right. Do you know whether- Tasters used the, ah, document that
you submitted to them for their own internal purposes. Do you know
why they use that document that you sent to them at the end of the
day?

Nelson:

Ah, I a — I assumed—

Doctorman:

I don't want you to assume.

Nelson:

Oh.

Doctorman:

I want you just to tell me whether or not you knew.

Nelson:

I don't knew.

Doctorman:

Okay.
Thank you.
And do you knew whether or not Tasters was
reimbursed by the food product demonstrator for your expenses?

Nelson:

No, I don't knew.

Doctorman:

If, ah, di—did you fry foods there?

Nelson:

Yes.

I provided al my own equipment.

Ah—

15

AKKtNUix 6 (Page 7 )

Doctorman:
Nelson:

I'm just looking at my notes here for a second,
delay.
That's okay*

I'm sorry for the

Doctorman:

Who asked you to work with Dynamic Demos?

Nelson:

Ah, Patsy did.

Doctorman:

Okay. This is the same Patsy Buckmiller that also wor—also visited
you when you were working for Testers?

Nelson:

Yes.

Doctontan:

Okay. Did—do you know i f you paid Patsy any fee for, whether your
work was at TfeTters or Dynamics?

Nelson:

No.

Doctorman:

You don't

Nelson:

I don't know.

Doctorman:

Okay.
And finally, I understood at the—at the end of your
questioning frcm the Judge that you understood Tasters to somewhat be
a middleman between the brokers—the food brokers and yourselves.

Nelson:

Yes.

Doctorman:

Let me just shortly consult with my client and see if she has any
questions, and then I'll—

knew vrtiether or not a fee was paid?
I don't think I did. As far as I knew, I didn't.

I have no further questions, Your Honor.
Judge:

Okay. Thank you. I have one question for clarification here. You
indicated that if there was a need for you to take time off a
substitute would be arranged. Did this ever incur to you?

Nelson:

Did I—to, a h —

Judge:

Did you ever have a substitute?

Nelson:

No. Wha—no.

Judge:

Okay. Mr. Levanger, any further questions?

Levanger:

No.

Judge:

All right then. Thank you for your time and we'll excuse you.

Nelson:

Okay. Thank you.

Judge:

Good-bye.

Didn't.

I do not believe so.
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Judge:
Baird:

Okay.
Do you recall entering any—into any, ah, written or oral
contract?
I don't think so. I don't think so. I did get a letter from them
saying I would be th—ah # s—ah, self-enployed, that I'd be liable for
self-employment tax. A h , —

Judge:

All right.

Baird:

That's it.

Judge:

Is it my understanding that work you performed then was demonstrating
food products in grocery stores?

Baird:

Yes.

Judge:

Did you perform any work outside of that parameter?

Baird:

No. No, other than going into meetings in Salt Lake, ah, and being
paid for that. We received $10.00 for going to instructional meetings
in Salt Lake, but that's all. Other than that, the only work I did
for them was in grocery stores. Yes.

Judge:

And hew were you paid for your work you performed in the grocery
stores?

Baird:

By check.

Judge:

Okay. Were you paid by the day, by the hour? What was the basis?

Baird:

By the day.

Judge:

Hew much were you paid?

Baird:

Ah, it was $5.00 an hour, so it was, ah, we were paid for—well,
usually I worked th—it was seven hours and i — I was there for eight
hours, but I had half an hour for lunch and two 15-minute breaks.

Judge:

How often would you come to Salt Lake for a meeting?

Baird:

Oh,not very often.
something like that.

Judge:

And what was the purpose for the meeting?

Baird:

Just to show, ah, just for us to learn the procedure that we needed to
follow in—in demoing a particular product.

Judge:

And hew would you learn of the meeting?

Baird:

They would go through t h e —

Judge:

Excuse me, how did you knew that the meeting w a s —

Ah,

once

in—probably
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Baird:

—that we needed to know and# ah, then someone would demonstrate hew
we would—hew we would, ah, promote that particular product.

Judge:

How would you knew that a meeting was to be held?

Baird:

Hm.

Judge:

Okay. Ms. Baird, a*e you speaking with somebody else there?

Baird:

Yes. My husband is right here.

Judge:

Okay, just give your testimony to the best of your recollection and—
and don't consult with anybody else.

Baird:

Okay.
I really—I really don't remember.
I believe it was b y —
through the mail, and notice through the mail; but I—I don't remember
and I don't have anything on hand—

Judge:

Okay.

Baird:

— t o verify that.

Judge:

That's fine. Were you required to attend the meeting?

Baird:

No.

Judge:

So it was le-left up to your discretion vftiether you'd come into the
meeting.

Baird:

I wasn't, ah, I wasn't, ah, punished in any way or deprived from work
by not attending.

Judge:

All right. Who would be present at the meetings?

Baird:

Pardon me?

Judge:

Who would be present at the meetings?

Baird:

Ah, oh, a great many of the other demonstrators. I think, ah, the
demonstrators that went to the meetings were the ones that
demonstrated the product.

Judge:

Where was the meeting held?

Baird:

In a location in southwest Salt Late. I don't recall the location of
it at the moment. It was up east of Highland Drive and, ah, about
40th South.

Judge:

Okay. Was it in a commercial building, in a heme?

Do you remember if I got a letter or if that was, ah, I don't—

I don't believe so.
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Judge:

Who determined those hours of work?

Baird:

I don't knew. I don't know. They were just, ahm, a information sheet
I received when I was told where to go and—and what I was—would be
demoing and, ah, let's see, Sandi signed it.

Judge:

Okay.
Yo—are you saying then that you received same* type of
correspondence in the mail exxrarning the demonstration?

Baird:

Yes.

Judge:

Okay.

Baird:

I didn't hear you.

Judge:

What would be in that information you would receive from Ms. Ochn?

Baird:

Oh, let's see. I have a sanple here. I'll read it. Now this isn't
signed by anybody. It's from Taster^ Inc., ah, Sandi Oohn, at the
top of the letterhead:
dem—"Demonstration Report", for instance,
this time I did Albertsons. I was report-to report to a particular
person and, ah, the times were from 11 to 7 and 10 to 6, ah, on Friday
and Saturday. From, ah, let's see, vtoat else di—was your question?

Judge:

Okay.

Baird:

Okay. And then on this same for we—we gave back the information of
how it went, how much we sold, that type of thing.

Judge:

Did you oonplete a report on the conclusion of every demonstration?

Baird:

Yes.

Judge:

And do you knew the reason for the report?

Baird:

It was, ah, for the pr~for the producers or the manufacturers to knew
hew much was sold and then we also sent a copy in to the main office.

Judge:

To who's main office?

Baird:

Tasters.

Judge:

Okay.
Did anybody supervise you vrfiile you were performing your
demonstrations?

Baird:

No. Occasionally one of the girls from the main office, ah, would
cane and—would come by and see hew we were doing and—but we—no, we
weren't—there wasn't somebody there all the time.

Judge:

Who would come by to visit?

Baird:

I don't really remember the names of the other girls.

What would be in that information you'd receive?

Ah, that would cover it.
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was a Bonnie and,

ah, hm, there were about

three, ah; and they just

come by to see how we were doing and—and, ah, help us if there was
some way they could shew us how to do it better.
Judge:

Okay. You mentioned they were from the main office.
they were from the main office?

How do you knew

Baird:

Well, because they worked with Sandi. They were there at the meetings
when—when we had—they were part of the one—they were seme of the
people that shewed us how to do—hew to demonstrate a product.

Judge:

Okay.

Baird:

Yes.

Judge:

Did Tasters furnish you with anything?

Baird:

Ah, something like a — a micrcwave or a, ah, or a fry pan, something
like that; but usually it was my own—ray own equipment, spatulas and—
and all the things I needed. Ihey furnished us with aprons. We paid
$10.00 for the aprons and—and, ah, so they sold us those, but, ah,
no. It was primarily ray own equipment.

Judge:

Was there any logo on the apron?

Baird:

Yes, Tasters.

Judge:

Okay.

Baird:

No. Not during the period of time I was working for Tasters. No.

Judge:

Were you free to accept or decline any of the jobs?

Baird:

Yes.

Judge:

Did you receive a questionnaire from the Department?

Baird:

Yes. From—you mean from—

Judge:

From the Department of Employment Security.

Baird:

Yes, I did.

Judge:

Did anyone instruct you in the manner in which the document was to be
completed?

Baird:

No.

Judge:

Did you on—answer the, ah, questions honestly in the bes—and to the
best of your ability?

Did you furnish your own equipment?

Do you perform this type of work for anybody else?
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Levanger:

rxurii^ this time, did you have an office?

Baird:

No.

Levanger:

Do you have a business license?

Baird:

No.

Levanger:

Are ycu listed in alhy kind of business directories?

Baird:

No.

Levanger:

You don f t—do you, ah, maintain a business telephone?

Baird:

No.

Levanger:

Do you advertise in the newspapers?

Baird:

No.

Levanger:

Was there any time during this period of time that, ah, you incurred
any loss or liability as a result of the type of work that you do?

Baird:

Ah, let me think. No.

Levanger:

There was no occasion that you recall, for exairple, that you may have
spilled something on a customer or something of that nature, a frying
pan falling on somebody's toe?

Baird:

No.

Levanger:

Okay. Thank you. That's all the questions I have. Thank1 s Eve.

Baird:

Okay, Counsellor, do you have some questions you'd like to ask?

Doctorman:

Yes, Your Honor.

No.

Eve, my name is Gary Doctorman; and to clarify the record! for the
Judge, I had thought that I had known you. I told him before we
called, but—
Baird:

I can't hear you, Gary.

Doctorman:

I will speak up.

I apologize.

Eve, my name is Gary Doctorman. I'm an attorney. I represent Tasters
in this hearing, and before the hear—before we called you on the
telephone, I'd represented to the Judge that I knew you; but after I
had—just from the name, I think I have a mistaken identity. D—we
don't knew each other, do we?
Baird:

Ah, no.

Not—I don't believe so.
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Baird:

Ah, to see how sales were going and see h o w — i — I — i f I were doing the
job the way it was supposed to be done and to—for optimum sales, ah,
th—I—and their appearance helped roe to do the j—once th—once or
twice they just, ah, took seme of the demo material and—and, ah,
showed me—n~-didnft show me how to do it, but just went up to
custcmers and—and, ah, I suppose, helped me.

Doctonnan:

As a general rule, were you at the store alone or were yc^ji there with
a supervisor from Tasters?

Baird:

Alone.

Doctonnan:

And it was only on a couple of occasions that somebody from Tasters
appeared at the store?

Baird:

Oh, no. No. It was much more than that. I worked for them for, hm, I
think, what, two years—a year-and-a-half or two years.
I donft
recall.

Doctorman:

Do you knew whether or not the people who appeared at the store were
directly frcro Tasters, or were they fron the food manufacturers such
as Proctor and Gamble or Budget Gourmet, things of that nature?

Baird:

Ihey were from Tasters.

Doctorman:

Okay. But the details of the work, the hour-to-hour work, was left to
you to determine how to do.

Baird:

Yes, after we were told how to do it.

Doctorman:

Did Tasters ever tell you that you were—that you had to perform the
services personally?

Baird:

Oh, no. Why would they do that if they contacted me. Ihey informed
me by letter of—no.
Ihey didn't tell me that I had to do it
personally; but I wouldn't send ray husband to do it.

Doctorman:

Okay. But that would be your decision. Tasters didn't tell you you
couldn't send your husband to do it, did they?

Baird:

No.

Doctorman:

Did Tasters ever tell you that you did not have the right to hire
assistants to assist you in your demonstration?

Baird:

No.
It di—it never came up.
It didn't occur to me.
supposed to do a job, I do it myself.

Doctorman:

But if, ah, perchance, that you had agreed to take a job and then
southing came up and you could only work half the job, ah, did
Tasters ever tell you you couldn't hire somebody to do the other half
of the job?
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Baird:
Doctorman:

That didn't come up either.
Okay. It just wasn't an issue for you then?

Baird:

No.

Doctorman:

All right. That's fine. If a time schedule did not work for you, say
they--Tasters wanted a demonstration frxm 12 midnight 'til 6 in the
morning, you didn't feel you could work at that time, could you turn
that down?

Baird:

That's hypothetical. I don't, ah, I don't think that's relevant. I ~
it—that never came up, I —

Doctorman:

Okay. If any time schedule was inapprop—or inappropriate because you
wanted to visit a neighbor or take a vacation, ah, did you feel free
to turn it down?

Baird:

Ah, yes, I think so.

Doctorman: Okay.
Baird:

I don't think I turned down very many, but, ah, if any; but I would
have felt free to, ah, a—to ask them, yes.

Doctorman:

Okay.
Did Tasters ever tell you that you had to work only for
Tasters?

Baird:

Only for Tasters?

Doctorman: Yes.
Baird:

No.

Doctorman:

You were free to work for other peqple?

Baird:

That's right.

Doctorman:

Okay. What sort of investment did you have in the equipment that you
purchased?

Baird:

Oh, it was mirdmum^ I think. I paid about $40.00 for the fry pan and
$10.00 for the apron and, ah, table cloth from time to time. Ah,
that's about it; and the gas to and from was—sometimes amounted to
something, but—

Doctorman: What about the card table?

That—

Baird:

Oh, yeah. But that's scmething~-everybody has a card table. That's—
my husband just put a legs on it and it worked great.

Doctorman:

Okay.

And the serving pieces?

Ah, were those something that had to
33

APPENDIX G (Page 15)

Baird:
Doctorman:

No, it's not.
Did Tasters set a paoe for you? In other wards, what I'm asking you,
did they tell you how many people to solicit or hew many products t o —
that you had to demonstrate in the course of a day, or was that left
to you?

Baird:

That was left to me, of course, the more we demonstrated, the more we
sold; and I tried to sell the very most I could.

Doctonnan: Okay.
Baird:

They—they determined the product and the—and the method of demoing
and— (inaudible).

Doctorman:

Did Tasters ever tell ycu you were paid by the hour or did you just
take the job rate and divide it by the hour?

Baird:

They didn't tell me when to take a break. I would take it when it was
not as busy, and sometimes I didn't take one at all; so that's—that
was at my discretion.

Doctorman: Ah, I t h —
Baird:

Told me the hours. They gave me the written time to work, 11 to 7, 10
to 6, that type of thing.

Doctorman: Ah, you—this speaker phone may not, ah, be the best, ah, medium and I
appreciate your answer, but I di—that wasn't the question that I
asked, a n —
Baird:

Oh.

Doctorman: And so, let me—th—let me just confirm th—the answer that you gave
was another question I was going to ask, and that was that Tasters
did not tell you when to take lunch breaks or when to take, ah, any
other break during the day. Is that correct?
Baird:

That's right.

Doctorman: And the question that I—that I previously asked was concerning your
pay.
Baird:

Yes.

Doctorman:

Did yo—you'd said once in your testimony you were paid by the job and
then at another time you said you were paid by the hour. Did—

Baird:

(inaudible).

Doctorman:

Did you—le—let me just get the question out if I could, please; ah,
and I—I don't mean to interrupt you, but I—I do have a specific
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Baird:

question. Did you take the job rate and divide it by the number of
hours you worked, ocme up with the hourly rate?
No. No. They paid me $5.00 an hour. However, if I sold everything
that the store had in; and they could not get any more in, then that
was—that was my job for the day and they paid me for the full day; so
that's why I—that's why I didn't always work the full—the full
second day, because I had sold everything out.

Doctontvan: And—and that day you went heme early, but still got a full day—a
full—
Bairxi:

Yes.

Doctorman:

—pay.

Baird:

Uh-huh.

Doctorman:

Okay. And was that your understanding, if that occurred on a repeated
basis, that you would be paid the amount for—for a full-day
demonstration even though you ran out of product and went home earlier
in the day?

Baird:

I—that didn't come up until—well, I was delighted when I first did
that and they paid me for the full amount.

Doctorman:

Okay.

Baird:

I didn't knew that.

Doctorman:

It came up on one occasion then?

Baird:

Oh, on quite a few occasions. Ah, but I didn't knew it until I had
worked for than—oh, I don't knew, six months or so.

Doctorman:

Hew many occasions did that occur on?

Baird:

Oh, golly, I have no i—I don't knew.

Doctorman:

More than three?

Baird:

Yes.

Doctorman: Okay.

Less than 20?

Baird:

Yes.

Doctontvan:

Okay. Neighborh—round—just an estimate of hew many times; that you
ran out of product and were given a full, ah, deraonstra—a full fee
for an entire demonstration day and—

Baird:

I couldn't give an estimate on that.
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Oolmere:

With Tasters?

Judge:

Uh-huh.

Colmere:

Ah, demonstration, selling the product of the broker.

Judge:

All the work you did involved demonstrating products?

Oolmere:

Right.

Judge:

Where did you perform the work?

Colmere:

In grocery stores.

Judge:

All the work you performed then was in grocery stores?

Oolmere:
Judge:

Right.
Were—were you paid by the hour or by the day? What was the basis for
your pay?

Colmere:

I never figured it as an hourly wage. I just received for the two
days work that I received, I received the amount of $70.00.

Judge:

Were there occasions where you'd work less than two days?

Colmere:

Sometimes it was just a Saturday job, yes.

Judge:

Hew nuch would you get paid for the Saturday job?

Oolmere:

$35.00.

Judge:

Hew many hours would you work?

Oolmere:

Ah, from 10 to 6, half-an-hour lunch.

Judge:

Who scheduled the hours?

Colmere:

Tasters.

Judge:

And why would the hours be scheduled from 2 to 6?

Colmere:

That usually, in the grocery store, the traffic is the most prcminent
frcm 10 in the morning until 6 in the afternoon. That is vtoen the
traffic is more prominent in the grocery store.

Judge:

Oculd ycu take more than a half-hour lunch if you decided to do so?

Colmere:

No.

Judge:

Why oould^t you?
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Coliaare:

I never thought about it. I always just—half-an-hour lunch.

Judge:

Okay. Who told you you could take a half-an-hour lunch?

Colmere:

Pardon me?

Judge:

Who told you that you were only afforded a half-an-hour for lunch?

Oolmere:

Tasters.

Judge:

Do you recall in particular who the iniividual was?

Oolmere:

No.

Judge:

Okay.

Oolmere:

There's many people at Tasters, many girls.

Judge:

Did you ever participate in any training?

Oolmere:

No.

Judge:

Did you ever attend any meetings?

Colmere:

When the broker requests an item that he has to put into the grocery
store that needs special attention to sell th—that product, yes.

Judge:

So these meetings would be required by the broker.

Oolmere:

Correct.

Judge:

Okay.
Ah, were you free to decide whether you would attend the
meeting or not?

Oolmere:

Pardon me?

Judge

Could you decline to go to the meeting if you desired to?

Oolmere:

Oh, yes. Oh, yes. If I didn't want to do that product, I didn't
have to go to the meeting nor do the demonstration.

Judge:

Well, let's say, for instance, you wanted to do the product—

Oolmere:

Okay.

Judge:

—but do not want to attend the meeting.

Colmere:

Oh, you don't have to attend the meeting.

Judge:

So you could do the demonstration without—

Oolmere:

Right.

I was already trained front my previous demonstration job.

I—I f m selling his product.
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Judge:
Colmere:

—the meeting.
Right.

Judge:

Were you paid while you attended the meeting?

Oolmere:

Yes.

Judge:

Hew much were you paid for your attendance?

Colmere:

$10.00.

Judge:

What would take place at the meetings?

Oolmere:

The broker would be there.
He would request hew he wanted
represented, ah, what we were to say to present this product, ah, shew
us the product, what the product tastes like.

Judge:

You mentioned here he would tell you what to say. Would they give you
a dialogue?

Colmere:

Yes. They would—they wanted you to put a presentation of th~the
product that you're selling to the public, so theyfd tell you vrtiat to
say.

Judge:

And this would be the broker?

Colmere:

Uh-huh.

Judge:

Would he verbally tell you or would he give you a written format for
yo to follow?

Oolmere:

Ju—just, you know, he would—he would tell us what—what he would
request us to say. We could put it in our cwn words, but he wanted
that presentation brought to, you knew—

Judge:

He would give you the general ideas.

Colmere:

Right.

Judge:

Did you furnish anything outside of the frying pan, card table, table
cloth, utensils and that type of thing?

Oolmere:

No.

Judge:

Okay. That would be the extent of the things you would furnish?

Colmere:

Uh-huh.

Judge:

Would Tasters ever furnish you with anything?

Colmere:

A micrcwave oven if it was needed.

I furnished them.
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Colmere:
Judge:

Hu-uh.
Okay. Did you ever incur any particular problems during the: course of
your demonstration that you oouldnft handle?

Colmere:

No. But if there was, I would have to take that up with the store
manager. The—the minute—the way that I see it is, when I walk into
this grocery store, I have to follow their rules of the way the store
is run and handled; and I think that that store manager is—does then
beocme my boss for the two days that, ah, I am there. If a problem
should cone up, I ha—I more than likely would take it up with the
store manger.

Judge:

Okay. What interaction would you have with the store manager?

Colmere:

Well, the—the first thing that I do is I go and ask him where he
would like me to set up; and he will say here or there; and if there's
a product, if he 1 11—if my—if lfm standing beside my product or if
I'm not, he'll say, "Would you like to go stand by your product or
would you rather be further away frcm the product that you're
demonstrating?" And usually I'll say, "No. I like to be standing
beside it." And he'll say, "Okay, that's fine. What wet'11 do is
we'll just move the product down to \ibere you are standing,," And he
sets it up so I'm right there by the product that I'm demonstrating.
Ah, if there's anything I — I need, such as maybe a long extension
cord, which I do not carry. I carry an extension cord, but if I do
need a long one, then I usually go to the store manager and say, you
knew, could you find me one or would you help roe and—

Judge:

Okay. Would anyone ever assist you in your work?

Colmere:

No.

Judge:

Ah, did you ever have somebody substitute for you?

Colmere:

No.

Judge:

What reports would you ccnplete?

Colmere:

Ah, I'm sent a fact sheet on every job. It would be hew much product
I have before I started work, how much product I had for the
demonstration and how much product did I sell; and then I would have
it signed by the store manager.

Judge:

Okay.
What was the purpose of having the store manager sign the
report?

Colmere:

To verify that I was there for the two days.

Judge:

Okay. While performing this work for Tasters, did you do this type of
work for anybody else?
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Colmere:

No.

Judge:

Did you seek to do it for anybody else?

Colmere:

Yes, they—I have demon—other demonstrators call me during the week
to do other jobs; but, ah, I don't like to work with over one; so I
usually stick with Tasters; because they're good. They're fair to me,
and I just stick with Tasters; and yet, I do have other demonstrators
calling me; but I don't—I don't accept the jobs.

Judge:

Why do you prefer just to be one—be—be with one?

Colmere:

Because it's more dif—it's difficult to have more than—than one;
because then, you knew, you're—you're looking at your date book or
your calendar and you're figuring out, okay, which company am I
working for this weekend, ah, vdho's paying me this weekend or, you
know, what company am I working for; so I just generally stay with
Tasters; and they've been very fair with me.

Judge:

Have you ever considered going directly to the manufacturers to do the
demonstration?

Colmere:

No.

Judge:

Mr. Levanger, do you have any questions?

levanger:

Just a few questions in clarification mostly. I'm John Levanger. I'm
the individual that sent you that terrible form you had to fill out.
You indicated earlier that you, ah, from time to time you attended,
ah, training meetings, ah, with various food brokers in which, ah, at
which time you received training on hew to demonstrate certain
products. Is that correct?

Colmere:

Right.

Levanger:

You also indicated you were paid for those meetings, $10.00.

Colmere:

By the broker.

Levanger:

The broker paid you the $10.00.

Colmere:

Right.

Levanger:

Okay. Ah, you also< indicated, ah, they were not a required meeting.
Is that correct?

Colmere:

No.

Levanger:

Were there any occasions when you failed to attend, ah, one of these
training sessions for any reason and then, subsequent to that, ah,
demonstrated the product for the broker?

You didn't have to go.
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Levanger:

No. I—if I wasnft at the training of that, I did not do the product;
but then I usually did a different product that I was familiar with,
Okay. Who instructed you on, ah, on when to go to work?

Colmere:

They would cadi me.

Levanger:

When you say "they", who do you mean?

Colmere:

Tasters would call me.

Levanger:

Who would instruct you on where to go to work?

Colmere:

Tasters.
I always figured that Tasters really was not my boss.
Tasters was a middleman for me, because I was—Testers is in between
the broker and roe. I am selling the product of the bro—broker.
Tasters was not my boss. Tasters is a middleman for me.

Levanger:

If that were the case, why is it then the broker didnft call you to
tell you when to go to work?

Colmere:

Well, because brokers have more to do than just call girls for
demonstrations. I' ve always— (laughing).

Judge:

You've indicated you've done this type of work on prior occasions
before you started working with Tasters.

Colmere:

Uh-huh.

Judge:

So you consider yourself a, basically, trained in all the procedures
involved in, ah, in, ah, how—how this work is to be performed. Is
that correct?

Colmere:

Yes. Ah, all women, I feel, know how to cook a hanburger or a—or a
hot dog, which is, ah, all—all women know how to feed people.

Doctorman:

How about us men?

Colmere:

Well, you're the worst of the lot.

Colmere:

(Laughing)
Doctorman:

I apologize, Your Honor, I shouldn't have interrupted.

Judge:

That's all right.

Levanger:

Ah, that statement made me loose my train of thought.

Doctorman:

These hearings can use a little humor new and then.

Levanger:

I know. Ah, were there any occasions when you received instructions
from an individual for Tasters in hew to do any of your
demonstrations?

(Lau^iing).
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Doctorman:

Your Honor, just for the clarity of the record, Pat's gonna—her—
voice goes up and down a little bit, and if I could request an
instruction to the witness to be sure that she speaks loud enough so
we get it on the tape.

Judge:

It should be recording, but be sure you do speak loud enough that it
can be heard.

Levanger:

You've indicated that there are reports that you must submit as to the
work that you perform. Is that correct?

Oolmere:

Yes.

Levanger:

To your recollection, has there been any occasion when, ah, you have
submitted a report that has been returned to you?

Oolmere:

No.

Levanger:

The equipment that you furnish, card table, frying pan, spatulas,
these—this is equipment that you have purchased?

Oolmere:

Right.

Levanger:

Did you have any of this fquipment on—equipment on had prior to your
association with T&sters?

Oolmere:

Yes, seme. Home—heme use things that I had in my home before I
started with Tasters.

Levanger:

So it's equipment you used at home prior to your working for them?

Oolmere:

Right.

Levanger:

Do you use this equipment at home?

Oolmere:

No.

Levanger:

You—you reserve it for work just with Tasters?

Oolmere:

For—for the demonstration. If therefs a product that I need during
the course of that year, like say a—a frying pan or a table or, you
know, scitething that I need to purchase, ah, I purchase it with my own
money. I then, ah, save the receipt; then—I then take it to my tax
auditor and she, as the supplies for my demoing job.

Levanger:

Do you have a business license for the work that you do?

Oolmere:

No.

Levanger:

Are you listed in any business directory?

Oolmere:

No.
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Doctorman: And does Tasters financially reward you if—if—if you're a great
demonstrator o r —
Colmere:
No.
Doctorman:

— f o r exceptional performance?

Colmere:

No.

Doctorman:

Do—does Tasters punish you if your performance is poor?

Colmere:

No.

Doctorman: When, ah, you submit your expense vouchers to Tasters, do you know
whether or not Tasters is paying the expense vouchers or whether or
not the food broker is actually paying your expense?
Colmere:

The food broker is paying the expense.

Doctorman:

Hew do you knew that?

Colmere:

I — I — I figure that the—the—like the toothpicks, napkins, paper
tcwels or whatever, when I purchase them with my own money, send that
receipt in with my fact sheet, that fact sheet and receipt is then
sent to the broker and he reimburses me for the—the product—the—and
what I have purchased to bring that product cane across.

Doctorman:

Okay.

Colmere:

That's h—that's—I—Tasters is notrayboss.

Doctorman:

Did you have, ah, any problems with the questionnaire that was sent
out by the Department?

Colmere:

I can't even remember sending a questionnaire or even signing one. I
guess I must have, but I can't—I can't remember doing it.

Judge:

Let's ask her about this at the moment now that you brought it up,
Counsellor.

Doctorman:

That's fine.

Judge:

Is that your signature on there?

Colmere:

That is true.

Judge:

Okay.

Colmere:

Ye—that's true.

Judge:

Did you ccnplete this questionnaire?

Colmere:

I did.

So Tasters is still the middleman.

Do you recognize that questionnaire?
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Judge:

And did anyone instruct you hew to oatplete the question?

Oolmere:

No.

Judge:

Did you freely and honestly, ah, answer the questions?

Oolmere:

I did.

Judge:
Oolmere:

Did you have sane, ah, problems understanding any of the questions?
No.

Judge:

Okay. And, ah, is this a typical report that you would submit to
Tasters and the broker?

Oolmere:

Yes.

Judge:

All right. Go ahead and continue, Counsellor.

Doctorman:

What do you estimate your investment into your equipment to be vihen
you add up your card table, your trying pan, your table cloths, ah,
whate—all the other things that—that you use?

Oolmere:

I usually let ray tax auditor do this. Ah, approximate, $150.00.

Doctorman:

Okay. Thatfs dollars a year?

Oolmere:

Yes. Thatfs with the table and the frying pan.

Doctorman:

Okay.
yo—

Oolmere:

No.

Doctorman:

That's your expense.

Oolmere:

Personal. Right.

Doctorman:

If, ah, the equipment was lo—was damaged in a demonstration, say
you'd dropped the frying pan or your card table leg broke for seme
reasons, is—whose expense is that?

Oolmere:

Mine.

Doctorman:

Okay. If you were to negligently hurt somebody or damage something,
say by spilling something on their clothing or burning them with some
grease or, ah, something of that nature and it was determined that it
was your fault, who should pay for that loss or damage?

Oolmere:

Me.

Doctorman:

Let me just review one set of notes, Your Honor.

If—and youfre not reimbursed that at all by Tasters?

That's

I have no further
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Doctorman: —and your discretion?
Belrose:
Right.
Doctorman: And you're free to select the time and places where you work?
Belrose:

Reject or accept.

Doctorman: Okay.
Belrose:

Yeah.

Doctorman: W h a t — w — w e
know that you use equipment at your—at your
derconstration, which may include, and I don't know whether it includes
a trying pan, a card table, a table cloth, serving pieces amd perhaps
even other things that you might remind me of. What are those things,
and v*iat is your investment in those items?
Belrose:

A monetary investment?

Doctorman: Uh-huh.
Belrose:

I would not think it would exceed, ah, $50.00.

Doctorman: Okay.
Do you expense, ah, that equipment on your tax forms as a
business expense?
Belrose:

I have not filled out a tax form yet.

You mean a — a —

Doctorman:

Since you started work—working for Tasters you haven't—

Belrose:

Right.

I have been 1—here less than a year.

Doctorman: Okay.
If, ah, your equipment is damaged in the course" of your
demonstration, who is responsible for that—that—that financial loss?
Belrose:

I am.

Doctorman: Are you paid by the job or are ycu paid by the hour?
Belrose:

The job.

Doctorman: And you've checked here that you consider yourself an independent
ccxitractor.
Belrose:

Right.

Doctorman:

Can you tell me why that is.

Belrose:

I can either accept or not accept the jobs that are offered to me. I
can, if I'm unable to meet the appointment at a late date, I can
substitute, ah, someone else who is knowledgeable. I take care of my
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cwn taxes, my own expenses.
Doctornvm:

Have you had occasion to substitute someone else?

Belrose:

No.

Doctorman:

But you—you feel you have the right to do that.

Belrose:

Right.

Doctorman:

Do you feel you have the right to hire soneone else if you so choose
and pay them for a portion of our demonstration.

Belrose:

Right.

Doctorman: Vlhen you are at the store performing you demonstration, can you
perform your demonstration at your c*m pace, meaning, when I talk
about pace, the—the amount of people you contact, the amount of
product that you display or are specific requirements set forth on
your pace by Tasters?
Belrose:

My cwn pace.

Doctorman:

If you fail to report your expenses to Tasters, ah, v*io pays for those

expenses?
Belrose:

I would.

Doctorman: Okay. I have no further questions, Your Honor.
Judge:

Okay. A little formality here. I refer you to this document that has
been labelled as Exhibit Ten, and do you recognize that document?

Belrose:

I can recognize nothing without these, up close. Yes.

Judge:

Did you complete that questionnaire?

Belrose:

Uh-huh.

Judge:

Okay. And is this your signature here on Ten D?

Belrose:

Yes.

Judge:

All right. Then have you also submitted this, ah, list of about 14
items on Tasters letterhead and the aocotpanying demonstration report.
Did you provide those with—with the questionnaire? Did you sen—

Belrose:

To him, you mean?

Judge:

To the Department. Did you send those in?

Belrose:

I remember this one.
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Doctonnan:

then they tell us, yes, no, well, can't we negotiate a little bit on
that price; and we come up with a price.
okay. And hew is the fee paid? Hew is the fee determined for the
demonstrator?

Oohn:

Oh, in much the same way. Ah, there really, you knew, as far as the
types of demos, it's pretty straightforward. There are certain kinds
of demos the hours are dictated by the stores and—and by the numbers
of people in the stores at the time; and so when we bid the job with
our client, we knew what percentage of that would go to the
demonstrator; and basically we know how nuch it costs us to run our
office, to make a profit, pay the bills and we—we generally know the
amount of money that we need to make; and, therefore, what we can pay
the demonstrator plus what we want to make determines the price of the
demo.

Doctonnan:

Does—so it's—it's a ne—both sides are negotiated?

Oohn:

It's negotiated and it's kind of established by the area. Like in Las
Vegas, we can't get people to work for the same amount that they work
here. They'll tell us, "No. We won't work for that." or such and
such another company pays us so nuch more; and so we have different
rates for different areas and different types of demonstrations.

Doctorman:

Are demonstrators paid by the hour?

Oohn:

No. They're paid a demo fee for their type of demo. They can—they
can divide it up any way they want. I mean I've had demonstrators
say, "Well, d o — I get paid for lunch when I work for another cewpany."
and I say, "Well, if you want to take the amount of money we pay you
and divide that up by two hours or ten hours, I don't care." I pay
them a demo fee and they can say whatever they want as far as hew
their paid.

Doctorman:

Does Tasters review the performance of the demonstrators?

Oohn:

No. And, in fact, occasionally we'll get a report or a call from a
client who will say, you know, the demonstrator didn't get the manager
to sign or didn't—there was no cement about the demonstrator; and we
send the reports in as we get them. We send them in to our client.
We have a three-part survey of the demo; and that's so that our client
knews that that demonstration was done; and we ask the demonstrator to
keep one copy in case the other get lost in the mail caning to us. We
keep another copy in case it gets lost going to our client; and many
times they'll call and say well, they misplaced this or that form and
part of the reason they like working with Tasters is that we have a
copy of everything that goes out. For tax purposes, we're required to
keep a copy of the receipt for the product; and so there's never a
doubt that if anything gets misplaced or lost, we can always have a
backup and send it to them; and they will not pay us without having
the report and the receipts for merchandise or supplies; and, ah, we
even have to send them—if we have to send things out UPS, we have to
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Whoever it is, I'm forwarding.

(?)

Go ahead and continue.
Doctorman:

Does Tasters determine the time at which the demonstrations shall b
performed?

Oohn:

No.

Doctorman:

Who does?

Oohn:

The client.

Doctorman:

And why—do you know v*iy the client selects certain times for the
performance of demonstrations?

Oohn:

Well only that those are the times that seem to be established
industry-wide when there are the most shoppers in the store. A — a
demonstrator can go to the store or—or when she confirms her
demonstration with the department manager, he might tell her# "Well, I
don't want you to come in at 10. Our store is a night store. Ccme in
at noon and work until 8.ff If she wants to do that# she will. If she
can't do that, she'll call and say, "Well, I can't do that demo and I
have a party at my house." It's—it's, ah, it's just all arranged
with the best thing for the store. If it's better for the store to
have a half-a-day or a whole day, ah, many times a store won't buy as
much product as the manufacturer wants them to buy, so they'll give
them a half-day demo. That's generally the reason there's a half day
or a whole day. If one chain buys a thousand cases and another has
only seven stores and buys 500, then they don't get as many demos; and
it's just strictly controlled with what the client offers to the store
when they buy the product.

Doctorman:

Can the demonstrator determine the time in vrtiich they work by either
accepting or rejecting various times that are offered?

Cohn:

Oh, yeah, because, ah, we have all kinds of jobs; and sometimes we
start out on a Monday morning with jobs for the next three or four
weeks to offer people; and they cadi us. We tell them what we have,
when the hours are, ah, if we just took in a run of jobs for 20
stores, the first person who calls us, or the first person we call
could take any one of those 20 stores or the ones in their area that
they wanted to go to.

Doctorman:

So th—the demonstrator can also determine their location by—vfoere
they're gonna work by selecting what's available.

Oohn:

Definitely, or by selecting the hours. If there are half-day jobs and
whole-day jobs, there are people vdio only work Saturdays or only work
Fridays or, you know. It just depends on what they want to do.

Doctorman:

It's up to the demonstrator?
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Cohn:

Uh-huh.
Is it up to Tasters as to where and when a particular
demonstrator works?

Oohn:

No.

She accepts a job or declines.

Doctorman: While the demonstrator is at the store, who determines the details of
hew the demonstration is performed?
Cohn:

I would say the demonstrator, unless the—the manager—our clients
don't like us to use pretzels as an exanple; because if it's a hot
dog, the pretzel has extra salt; but we have a number of meat managers
who don't want toothpicks lost on the floor; and they'll say, "In ray
store, you use pretzels." So in that store she'll use pretzels; and
it's—it's a snail thing, but, you know, it—it's—they do vrtiat the
manager wants.

Doctorman: Ah, y—when we discussed your testimony, you—you'd given me an
exairple about a tortilla denonstration. Can you recall that?
Cohn:

It's one of my favorites.

Doctorman:

Why don't you tell us about that.

Cohn:

We were demonstrating tortillas that were siirply to be warmed in a fry
pan and lightly buttered, cut into serving pieoes and sanpled; and I
got a call from a demonstrator in Renroerer, Wyoming, who said she had
used peanut butter and jelly and was concerned, would she get her
supply money back; and we had talked about it and I said, "Well, did
you sell tortillas?" and she said nobody would buy than because
people in Kammerer didn't know about tortillas at that time, but she
decided to make peanut butter and jelly sandwiches and then she sold
out; and we just kind of lau^ied about it and I said, you knew, "I'm
sending the bill. Of course, you'll be paid, why not?", but it's a
very siirple kind of a situation. What works for you, do it; and if
you're successful, that's all we want is a successful demonstration
for our store, for our client. The demonstrator wants to do a good
job generally.

Doctorman:

So in seme locations butter on tortillas makes sense but in other
locations, peanut butter and jelly makes sense.

Cohn:

That's the way it goes.

It's cxmrnon sense. Whatever works, do it.

Doctorman: And Tasters doesn't determine that. That's up to the demonstrator t o —
Cohn:

Ric£it.

Doctorman:

— t o do that.

Cohn:

Right.
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Doctontan:

Does Tasters supervise the demonstrator in the stores in any way?

Cohn:

Not in any way.

Doctonnan:

You were sitting here
workers v*x>—one or two
the store to, ah, and
those Tasters employees

Cohn:

Well, we have one person in Utah that we call an area rep. Her name
in Bonnie Jeffs. Bonnie goes to the store, if itfs a new person who
just took a job and needs a report. We tell the people, "If ycu donft
have a report, write on a plain piece of paper where you work, what yo
did, how it went, sign it, have the manager sign it. It's as good as
a report." And we get a lot of those. If we can and if we have the
time and obviously because we do so many demos with one person, there
is no way we can supervise, but Bonnie will take the cups and forks.
She'll take a report; and if the demonstrator thinks that Bonnie is
supervising her, that's in the demonstrator's mind. What may happen
is that our client will go around, ah, when we have these big
promotions with Proctor and Gantole or General Mills, as I said before,
they have unlimited resources apparently, and they will send people
out; but even they cannot check all the demos; because it's just
physically impossible to get to that many locations and supervise
every demonstrator. Ah, they may hit a quarter of than or a half of
them depending on how many there are in a given weekend; but, ah,
there's no way to supervise these people sufficiently. Ah, there's no
way that Tasters could make any money if we had to send a supervisor
to every job..

Doctontan:

Does Tasters
demonstrators?

Cohn:

You mean like critique on their work?

issue

th—vith the testimony of a nuntoer of your
of than said that someone fran Tasters came to
was at the store with them. Were—why were
in the store?

written

reports

of

s—of

performance

to

Doctonnan: Yes.
Cohn:

No.

Doctorman:

Does tasters have an eatployee review of—of a dononstrator on a
periodic basis?

Cohn:

Absolutely not.

Doctorman:

Is there—does Tasters require the demonstrator to perform
demonstrations in a certain way or manner or does Tasters give general
guidelines?

Cohn:

We give general guidelines: be there, do a good job, return your
report and, ah, that's about it.
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experienced demonstrators?
Oohn:

Oh, no; but the demonstrators working in the store # sometimes they're
three or four companies represented there; and they do talk a lot and
trade ideas. We hear a lot of that, that they met demonstrators from
other companies and—but we don't ask anyone to stand over another
demonstrator and train them.

Doctorman: And if someone on a questionnaire had answered, ah, that that did in
fact happen, what would be your explanation for that?
Oohn:

Well, it was not at Tasters request.

Doctorman: Are demonstrators required to take any correspondence courses on how
to demonstrate?
Oohn:

No.

Doctorman: Are they required to attend any sales meetings?
Oohn:

No.

Doctorman: May a demonstrator's services be assigned to others?
Oohn:

It happens all the time.

Doctorman: Give us some exanples.
Cohn:

Ah, I talk to people who are new mothers. They want to work, but
they can only work half a day, and they split their demo with a friend
or—we have nursing mothers who trade jobs. We have husband and wife
teams. We don't even know, ah, when one takes over from another; and
in fact, two days ago I had a call from a person up in Treananton who
called to inquire what we pay; and, you knew, it was just a "Hello,
tell me how much you pay." And I didn't know if it was a client or
somebody wanting to demonstrate, so I asked who it was and why they
wanted to know; and she told me that she had been doing demos for us
for a long time. We didn't know she did demos for Tasters, because
the person that got her into doing demos apparently took the job, gave
it to her, the other person got paid and paid her a portion of what
she was paid; and she said she caught on to that, that Tasters didn't
know anything about her; and she wanted to work directly for us,
•cause she felt she'd get more of her pay; and I said, "Well, that's
really interesting and I'll put you on the list. We'll call you."

Doctorman:

Does Tasters have any objection that there was a middleman involved in
the—the work performed?

Cohn:

Well, no, because I think it happens a lot, just as indicated by the
Patsy Buckmiller testimony earlier who—Patsy is in Price and she
takes jobs and she gives them to other people. I really didn't know
that Debbie Henry also did that. I had no idea they were going in the
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Doctorman:

And do you have demonstrators that, say, work only onoe a—onoe a
year?

Cchn:

Well, we have demonstrators who will only work the Smith's Food Shew;
and we'll have demonstrators who, ah, I'll call—they1!! tell us
they111 call Tasters when they want to work, you knew, don't bother
calling them in between because they may only want to work new and
then;
and then we'll have demonstrators who want to work every
weekend and they'll call us and they'll say, I'm available for this
and this and this week. If we have jobs, we'll line them up. If not,
we'll put them on a list and call them vtaen we do. They'll call back,
"I still don't have a job for the first week in March." It depends on
the aggressiveness of the demonstrator; and it's really gotten to the
point where I would say 80 per cent of our jobs are filled by
denonstrators calling tasters; and, ah, these people v/ho demonstrate
generally don't want to work during the week; and it's even hard to
reach them; and that's why we can have a person work a half a day,
because the best time to reach people is, let's say, between 8 and
noon; so that person in our office is on the phone constantly all
morning just talking to people, people who call us or people that we
call.

Doctorman: And what's the ratio of people—of demonstrators calling in for work
as opposed to you soliciting them to—to work?
Oohn:

Oh, I would say 80 per cent of them call us.

Doctorman:

Do you have demonstrators that work in multiple cities?

Oohn:

Oh, yeah. We have, a h —

Doctorman:

Why don't you give us seme examples.

Cohn:

We have sane people who, ah, because they know we work in six states,
we have a gal whose husband lectures and he—when he goes to Reno, she
calls and says, "I want to work in Reno in two weeks because my
husband's gonna be there." or "I'm going down to Bullhead City for
the su—for the winter, certainly not for the sunnier, Ah, one of the
people who responded to this questionnaire, I think, is in Bullhead
right now, and she'll work there. O r —

Doctorman:

Who is that?

Cohn:

Vi Coleman.

Doctorman:

Okay.

Cohn:

And she'll work in Las Vegas.
It-—it's just, ah, an interesting
thing; and if people move, they say, "Well, I'm gonna be in Boise, you
knew, I'm moving to Boise. Call me for jobs in Boise." and that's the
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way it works.
Doctontan:

Now as I understand i t , Vi Oolaian works in Salt Lake, Bullhead City
and Tucson?

Cohn:

Uh-huh.

Doctorroan:

As—as her travel schedule determines.

Cohn:

Rictfit.

And she t e l l s us \*en.

pay for her phone c a l l s .

We don f t pay for her travel.

We don't

I t f s what she likes to do.

Doctontan:

She works vfoen—where she wants to work.

Cohn:

Definitely.

Doctontan: Okay. Can the demonstrator establish their own time schedule?
Cohn:
Yeah. Many times they do. If they want to leave early because they
have an engagement, the/ tell the store manager, "I'm cooing in front
10 to 6." even if we f ve said it's from 11 to 7; and if it f s okay with
him, it's fine with us. Most of the time we don't knew all of these
things that are going on; and we hear about them in much the same way
we heard about Debbie Henry an—supervising in Price today.
Doctontan:

Is the demonstrator free to work vAien and for vtficm he or she chooses?

Cohn:

Oh, yes.

Doctontan: Can they work for multiple companies?
Cohn:

Yes.

Doctontan:

Do you have people vrfx> hold dewn full-time jobs?

Cohn:

Ah, yes, we do.

Doctontan:

In addition to their demonstration work.

Cohn:

We have teachers.
We have nurses. We have gentlemen. We have
retired men. We have people v*x> go to school and then they schedule
their Fridays and Saturdays free so that, you knew, they're only in
school Monday through Thursday. Ah, we have teachers v*x> tell us they
make more doing demos than teaching.

Doctontan: That f s unfortunate. Hopefully the legislature will do something about
that this session.
Does the demonstrator—so a demonstrator's not restricted from doing
other work.
Cohn:

Absolutely not.

85

APPENDIX G (Page 35)

Doctorman: Are datcnstrators paid at the same time you pay other accounts
payable?
Cahn:
Yes.
Doctorman: And what do you—do you consider theirs—what do you consider your
payment franTasters to a demonstrator to be?
Cohn:

It's a payable. We—we pay them when we pay our bills.

Doctorman:

Is it a wage?

Cohn:

No. It's a demo fee. We also work with other demo companies. If a
client calls and gives us 40 denes and three of them are in New
Mexico, Testers doesn't work in New Mexico, but we have affiliates
there, ah, and we call them and say, "We have three demos. Can you
handle it in Albuquerque?" and then we'll pay Elite Presentations just
as we pay the denonstrator. She sends us the report, and we pay her
oonpany vAien we pay the demonstrators.

Doctorman:

So there may be occasion where you'll need to use yet another
middleman t o — t o get to the demonstrator.

Cohn:

Oh, many, yeah, 'cause we don't work in Billings, Montana; and we get
jobs there. Sane jobs we do as an aooomrtodation to our client. New,
in Billings, we make a few dollars on that job; but the person that we
use in Albuquerque charges more than we do; so it's strictly a service
to our client. We're glad to have the 37 jobs, and it's easier for
him if we send them to Albuquerque than for he; and, you knew, I'll
tell them, "Well, I can give you the name of a cocpany there." and he
says, "No.
Just take care of it."
So, we do that; and it's a
business accenmodation most of the time.

Doctorman:

Is the—are the demonstrators required to pay all of their own
expenses up front?

Cohn:

Oh, yes.

Doctorman: Okay.
Are the demonstrators reimbursed for all or part of their
expenses?
Cohn:

Well, oily for supplies like napkins, toothpicks, paper tcwels, the
supplies that it takes to do the deno; but if a demonstrator sends us
a bill for a paring knife or an apron or a table cloth, we don't pay
it; and we just cross it off the receipt.

Doctorman: Who—who is ultimately responsible for the payment of the expenses for
the serving of the food, the toothpicks and napkins, whatever?
Cohn:

The client.

Doctorman:

Testers does not pay for that out of its overhead.
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submit this and haveJudge:

I'll receive that as Exhibit Fifteen.

Doctontan:

—have you look at Exhibit Fifteen, Sandi; and is this the Exhibit
that was prepared by your office?

Cohn:

Yes, it was; and it's just a partial list of people that, ah, the
office staff renerabered and recalled that, yes, these people had said,
"Well, I can't work this week.
I'm working for Dynamic11 or "I'm
working for Classic." whatever. We don't keep a record of it, and we
don't really care.

Doctontan:

If, ah, a
terminated?

Cohn:

Not unless they tell us. We never terminate anybody, which means take
them off the list unless they say, "I'm moving to Oklahoma and I won't
be there." or, ah, you know, just for v*xatever reason, "I'm taking a
full-time job." Mostly they don't even tell us; and then we keep
calling; and maybe at the end of the year, they've never worked all
year, the ootputer will just automatically dunp anybody that's never
received any pay.

Doctontan:

But if they were to call you, ahr and say, like the 80 per cent of the
people V*K> do that call you and say they wanted to work, what would
you do?

Cohn:

Well, we try to keep anybody who wants to work working. Those v*x> say
"Yes", they're obviously the ones who work.

demonstrator's

Doctontan: Who
is responsible
demonstration?

for

producing

the

a

good

satisfactory

result,

completion

are

of

they

the

Cohn:

The demonstrator. That's from start to finish.

Doctorman:

Is the demonstrator obligated to perform a satisfactory demonstration
as a condition preceding for their payment?

Cchn:

No.
They would be paid unless they walked off the job or didn't
ootplete it or in seme really—I can't imagine why they would—

Doctontan: Maybe you didn't understand my question.
Is the—is the—must the
demonstrator satisfactory complete the demonstration in order—
Cohn:

Yeah.

Doctontan:

— t o get paid?

Cdhn:

Yeah. She has to do the job, get the manager to sign that she was
there, return her report and then she's paid.
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Doctorman:

Does pa—does Tasters pay a car allowance or milage?

Oohn:

No.

Doctorman: Does Tasters provide an office or a place to work—
Oohn:

No.

Doctonnan:

— f o r the demonstrators?

Cohn:

Absolutely not,

Doctorman:

Does Tasters pay the—any overhead of the demonstrators other—per—
does Tasters personally pay any of the overhead of the demonstrators?

Cohn:

No. Nothing.

Doctorman: Does Tasters have a personnel name?
Cohn:

No.

Doctorman:

Did tha—for demonstrators?

Cohn:

No.
We have some incidental things like "Fourteen Things to
Remember". We have a suggested list of what you need and then it f s
common sense. If you're doing cheese and crackers# you don f t need
three quarters of the things on the list; but people cadi us and ask
us questions; and we've gotten to the point where rather than answer
every question, we'll just zip that out; just in the same way we have
a little form letter that says, "Your receipt was not included with
your report. Therefore, we cannot reimburse you for supplies." And
it's just easier to send that, since we do so many, than to sit and
write little notes to everybody. We just have a file with things that
are appropriate and that's what we do.

Doctorman: Can demonstrators earn vacation pay?
Cohn:

No.

Doctorman: Can demonstrators earn side pay?
Cohn:

No.

Doctorman: Are there any career opportunities for—for demonstrators within
Tasters?
Cohn:

No. Only that, ah, if we needed someone in our office, and someone
said, "I'd like to change and do office work.", we have had two people
who came into our office from being demonstrators.

Doctorman: But t h e —
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Oohn:

That's just incidental.

Doctorman: Okay. And itfs clear that Tasters doesn't monitor the performance of
demonstrators with supervisors.
Cdhn:

No, we do not, nor could we.

Doctorman: May a demonstrator take a trip or leave on vacation without giving you
notice?
Oohn:

0h# they do all the time.

Doctorman:

Does Tasters exercise control over the detail of the work within the
store by the demonstrator?

Oohn:

Not at all.

Doctorman:

Does Tasters inspect the sales presentations by the demonstrators?

Oohn:

No.
Not unless required by our client, who then pays for that
service; and generally they do that themselves.

Doctorman: That's the exception.
Oohn:

The exception.

Doctorman: Okay. As a general rule, is there any contact between Tasters and the
demonstrator while the demonstrator is at the store?
Oohn:

Only if supplies are necessary; and, see we generally send—to an—any
place out of Salt lake, we mail the supplies and charge our client
freight and for the supplies. If itfs within the area and they're not
too many people, generally it's last minute stuff that Bonnie
delivers, jobs that were set up late and they require supplies. Ah,
we've even had her run up, you know, to—to Ogden or somewhere if it's
last minute. Ah, if it's iitpossible for us to get supplies there,
then we let the demonstrator purchase them vtaerever she can; and it's
usually at a higher expense to our client; so we try to help our
clients out by providing a case of spoons that we can deliver rather
than the demonstrator buying 25 spoons in a box for, you knew, 69
cents multiplied by 500. It's just more expensive.

Doctorman: That's a service for the client?
Oohn:

Ri^it. Which is another reason they call us instead of other people
that—that don't offer that service.

Doctorman: What—during a calendar quarter, what's the amount of unenployment
tax that you pay to the Department of Encplqyment Security?
Oohn:

It usually runs between $450.00 and $500.00 per quarter to Utah
Department of Unemployment Securities.
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Oohn:
Levanger:

Only if the client said—
And if that's the case, isn't—

Cohn:

— " I don't want to pay you."

Levanger:

Weren't you dealing out sane sort of reprimand if they weren't being
paid for that service?

Oohn:

I guess that would be an ultimate reprimand.

Levanger:

Well, you indicated earlier that it does happen.

Oohn:

Well, not where we don't pay thorn or reprimand them. We discuss it.
I had a demonstrator who onoe told a customer she was too fat and
didn't need another sairple; and I was just rather shocked; and when I
asked her about it, she said, "Golly, I knew I shouldn't have said
that." But she has worked for us sinoe then. Ah, whenever she says
"yes", she works; and she, I hope, doesn't insult customers.

Levanger:

You indicated also a little earlier a situation with, ah, with the
individual at Tremonton, apparently doing sane demonstration work that
you were not aware of?

Cohn:

Not aware at all. The person who gave her the job gave her our
report, but then that person signed her name, Lori Herdalgo; and her
name is on this list, because she works—she sets up demos for three
or four other conpanies.

Levanger:

So you have no concern whether this individual is really qualified to
do the demonstration at least in fact representing Tasters?

Oohn:

As long as she does her job well and the manager writes, "good job" or
no conment at all and sends that form back, Tasters is satisfied.

Levanger:

You would have no concern then that this individual might be like the
other individual you talked about for—that needed to be in a
sheltered workshop, that she too might need to be there?

Cohn:

No, because the managers always write back and say, "job well done" or
"send her back" or "okay". The number on canment we get fran managers
in Utah is "She done good." And if she done good, and I don't mean to
be facetious, but that truly is the number one comment that we get.

Levanger:

So you would receive a report back fran—from the person you weren't
aware of in Tremonton, that was doing the work? Would they not be
some indication there also that somebody else was assisting her?

Cohn:

No, we didn't know at all.

Levanger:

Well, one of the ladies today gave testimony, a lady from Price, and
I'm sorry I can't recall her name, that there were occasions when a —

It just never happened.
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Levanger:

that to our $25.00; and that's how we ocrae up with a fee to our
client.
So if I want to think through it and I say, cikay, I'm working ei^ht
hcurs at $35.00, I'm being paid the equivalent of $4.75 an hour.

Oohn:

Right.

Levanger:

And frun that I need to deduct my FICA and my, a h —

Oohn:

Right. New, this other demonstrator says, "I only work seven hours,
because I took my lunch and my breaks; and I'm making $5.00 an hour.11
I don't tell them hourly. We never ever discuss hourly and—

Levanger:

All right—

Cohn:

— y o u can see the reason we don't is because we're following the
guidelines of an independent contractor.

Levanger:

I'm—I'm—

Cohn:

Never discuss hours.

Levanger:

I'm there with that card table and I've been cooking the chicken and
all of a sudden the leg falls out from under the table and the pan
falls on the floor, hits somebody on the toe, it splatters than with—
with grease all over a $300.00 pants suit and it breaks her toe. What
happens?

Cohn:

The demonstrator has a problem.

Levanger:

What if I tell you I'm not going to pay for it?

Oohn:

We have never had that happen.

Levanger:

Okay.
it.

Oohn:

We're going to tell you that you're an independent contractor and that
you signed a contract that you're independent and you're responsible.
Now, we do have liability insurance. We have never submitted a claim
on our liability insurance; so yew're inventing a situation that could
happen; and I'm saying whenever anybody gets hurt, anything could
happen, They could sue T&sters, they could sue the demonstrator, they
could sue Costco, they could sue the chicken people. We don't knew
what they will do; and until they do it, we're saying we have never
had a claim. We have had one demonstrator cut her finger cit a food
shew and we've had one claim to workers compensation that we knew of.

Levanger:

I guess that's really my point. That this i s —

Cohn:

And it's not risky business.

It's happening now.

I'm telling you I'm not going to pay for
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Case No. 89-A-4044-Z
Case No. 92-BR-262-T

not set the time frames for each demonstration, Tasters
allows the brokers and store managers to mate this decision
for the demonstrators. Since the individual demonstrators
do not set their own hours, analysis of the facts of this
case under factor (g) strongly indicates enployee status for
the demonstrators.
Factor (k) asks "whether the individual submits no reports or is
required to submit regular oral or written reports to the enployer*.
The fact that demonstrators are required to submit detailed
reports to Tasters at the end of each demonstration strongly
indicates enployee status as opposed to independent
contractor status.
Factor (m) requires the Board to consider if applicable "whether the
individual
acxxunts for his own expenses or Is paid by the aiployer for
expenses11 •
Demonstrators are either provided incidental supplies, such
as toothpicks, napkins, cups, by the store or broker or
submit costs to Tasters, for reintxKsement. Significant to
the Board is the fact that Tasters has the right to approve
or disapprove questionable costs to be paid to the
demonstrators when the costs are submitted to then for
reiiitxinsenent.
Analysis of the facts under this factor
strongly indicates enployee status.
Factor (p) asks "whether the individual may realize a profit or
suffer a loss as a result of services perfonaad or cannot realize a profit or
loss by making good or poor decisions".
Analysis of the facts under this factor strongly indicates
enployee status as no matter how the demonstrator runs his
or her demonstration, i t has no effect on his or her
eventual pay for the demonstration*
The individual1 s
performance does not alter his or her profit or loss from
the venture.
Factor (r) asks "whether the individual has his own office and
assistants, holds a business license, is listed In business directories,
maintains a business telephone, or advertises in newspapers or does not make
services available except through a business in which he or she has no
interest".
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1381 East 2100 South, Suite B
SilbteOty, Utah 84106
(801)4664366
(80U466-DEMO

VERY IMPORTANT THINGS TO REMEMBER! 11
MOST IMPORTANT THING TO REMEMBER: CALL YOUR STORE NOV AMD THEN CALL AGAIN
ABOUT THREE DAYS BBFORE TO CONFIRM YOUR DEMO I till
lease read this before you go to work, and go through your training
materials often.
Dress appropriately.

Look professional. Please wear an APRON 1

Be on time.
Always set a beautiful table and use a neat tablecloth.
Take a careful inventory of your product and write the numbers
on your report sheet.
Serve a SAMPLE site serving of your product.
ALWAYS use the product name.
Try to sample every person that comes Into your store.
Keep an accurate count of the units used for your deao.
Keep your area clean and do not eat at your deao table.
0.

Take *j hour lunch and two 15 minute breaks. Try not to have
all of the demonstrators go to lunch at the same time.

1.

SMILE!!! Have fun and be creative.

2.

Be AGCRESSIVE and try to SELL OUTM11I

3.

Complete your report sheet, filling in every section. Attach a receipt
if you have any expenses, we cannot pay you without It. Sign It and
have your manager sign too.

14.

MAIL YOUR REPORT ON YOUR WAY HOME AT THE END OF YOUR DEMO! 11

PLEASE DO NOT MENTION THE NAME OF ANY OTHER STORE WHEN YOU ARE AX WORK. YOU
ARE REPRESENTING ONLY THE STORE THAT YOU ARE IN ON THE DAY OF YOUR DEMO AND IT
WOULD BE IN VERY POOR TASTE TO EVEN MENTION ANOTHER COMPANY. THE SAME GOES FOR
THE PRODUCT THAT YOU ARE SELLING. IT IS THE VERY BEST AND THERE IS NO NEED TO
COMPARE IT, BY NAME, TO ANY OTHER ITEM.
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TASTERS LTD.. INC.

($01)456-3366
(801) 4 66-DEM
PACKING YOUR BASKET
A good nights sleep
You - All neat and clean
Folding Table
Tablecloth
Electric frying pan
25 Foot extension cord
Roll of vide masking tape
Wastepaper sack (from the store only)
Spatula
Sharp knife
Serving fork
Nice platter
Smock or apron
Small cutting board
Grease can with lid
Moist cloth (in plastic bag)
Scissors, pen, marking pen and tape
Toothpicks, paper towels and napkins (save receipts)
Borrow a plant from the produce department (always ask)
Report form and envelope
HO - NO's
NO children (yours)
NO smoking on the job
NO chairs
NO books

TIP'^v
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1381 East 2100 South, Stitel
Salt Lake City, Utah 8410
(801)4664366
(801)466-DEM(

TASTERS LTD., INC.
DEMONSTRATION
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REPORT

CALL STORE NOVOOCONFIRM AVAILABILITY O F PRODUCT AND AGAIN 2 DAYS BEFORE DEMO
Nam* of Manager caltd to verify demoe _

DaleCaled:T
~7
Cy7
StoitrW J k ^ ^ & S ^
Store #

it,

ol Dtmoe

Project*

^

SunQ MonQ
MonO UmQ VMQ*tomQ
fJBtSajt
SunQ
TI«r«o«Democ//-7
W ? - g

Telephone *&£S'-»%Qf

/

//^ *-?

Dept: M O

Meaj)^ ProduetO

Address:.
Please, specify # of units]j e r c a s . ^ 2 ^ . ,. Aneyoureportingjnunits , . j _ —
Product 0ertK>re>Tate4^^yu^^t/<^C/-^? r> -^fi^>^9n
Inventory: ^
c2(l6A4*& , .
Beginning Inventory:
Lest Ending Inventory:
Equals Ibtal
Less Samples Used For Demo:
Amount Sold
/
v>>
Regular Price
3/l'rf)
IH&I. <s&T ^^MdUti^fL
Total Expenses Of any)

r2QdfW4

•Receipt must be a t t a c h for RetofaaWmeet.

/

SAVE EMPTY DEMO WRAPPERS FOR
COUPONS: At start of D « m a r 3 ^ 1 _ i = ^ N u m b t f Distributed

-£>

CREDIT
Use this credit form.
MM D
NoJSJ^
If yes. throw empty wrappers away after counting.
II no. leave empty wrappers with department manager.
NoQ
Leave yeDow copy with department manager
MttO
Credit Expense incurred
(Do not Include Items paid lor)

-

]
JlttlUP
extra COUpOfli lO MMtm

MEMO

EXHIBIT

10
&

(Si

Position o(\bur Demo
List ALL other Demos Going on UL
Store Traffic: Light
Medium JuH
Number of Fmons Sampled Mi
O^asumerResponsr^^

te&te jpittfuc?-^fri^Z

Comments by Demoi
Managers Comments
Managers Signature

*

*&£.

.

3 /^JLi/ujj^f^u-rxy

Demonstrator's Signature
. QrJe
Q
Days Worked Sun Mon Tue Wed Thun/fnJVSaD

KLi'uKT sum:;
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Our sales sre*growing and the demand for our services is ever expanding.
for your great work

Thanks to you

Tn ordtr to keep our great reputation, ve need to do an even better job of reporting.
Pltaae be extra cartful with your reporte. Fill in EVERY lined I We must know: Vhat yot
beginning inventory is, ending Inventor, UNITS USED FOR SAKPLES and your expenses, if any
If you are doing more than one product, such as beef 4 meat franks, list both on your the«
and count them separately. Your receipt must ba attached for reimbursement. Don't hold •
co chem and 'send them in a few weeks later, aa we bill our client and then cannot add cha
at the later date...and we can't gat paid until we submit all of your forms.
Keep track of the product you uss by placing tha empty demo wrapper in a bag marked with
name we enter on your report under: Save Empty demo wrappers for: leave this bag with you
department manager.
Put the regular and ssle price in end fill in ths remainder of the font M$ we need to kno<
as much aa possibls about your demo. Please make comments!!! We love comments!!! In the
consumer response section, tell us what the shopper really aald about the produce. Your
comment should be about the product, your day, the store, etc.
If your form is late in getting to you, or you do not have one at all, please make up a p
of plain paper wich the same information. If we have confirmed a job with you by telepho
and your form is lste, the job is ON unless we call you. It really helps if you will
jot all the information down when you are called.
THE CREDIT FORM: Thie la the aection outlined in black. Do not include items that you
have paid for in this section, such aa toothpicks, napkins, etc. Do lint items used for
your demo that you do not pay for.
The credit form is only used for a few clients, and will ba checked ^eit when it la
necessary. The following is an example:
U M this cre<*< form Y t s V N o O
Crtdii Eaptnsts incurred:

/y

Do noc inckidt fttms you have paid lor.
fv

f

w

Total

/&, frS~

9%

Leave the yellow copy of our report with your manager when you use thia credit aection.
How the fun part—get your manager to make a comment too. Be aura that you both sign the
bottom of the form. If you ahare a Job with someone ba aura both of you algo so we can

pay you correctly. There la always someone who can sign your sheet. If you want your
manager to sign and you know that ha or aha will ba leaving befort you do, make srrangeoe
with them in advance. If you do sell
necessary to enter the time you leave
personal messages on another piece of
chey are not interested in our "other

out»wrlte SOLD OUT on your report* It isn't
on your report when you aell out. Send ua your
paper as the reports goes In to our clients, and
stuff".

'**•. 11 in your report sheets carefully, completly & legibly. Return your signed report on
".he day your demo is completed and do keep the pink copy for your records.
" F.N ;JO SELL! I'SELL! !'SELL!!!
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